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SMART INSTRUMENT MIXES TO PROMOTE
GREEN BUILDING
YAYUN SHEN* & MICHAEL FAURE**
A smart mix of legal instruments is not new, but green building
(GB) compliance is. As a way to environmental compliance in general,
the mixing of instruments may also work to overcome the challenges
facing GB compliance. The mix can be justified by the failings of
government regulation, liability, and self-regulation. Therefore in
theory, a smart mix of instruments makes sense, since each of the above
instruments may be subject to imperfect information, private interests,
the inaccuracy of measurement, and/or ineffectiveness. In practice,
instrument mixes have been around in the U.S. GB laws. The theory and
the U.S. case law indicate that, first, GB compliance may owe its survival
to self-regulation in early times, but over time law and policy will play a
big role. Second, in pursuit of GB compliance, governments can make
the most of self-regulation by incorporating industry-based certifications
into statutory mandates. Apart from the traditional carrots and sticks,
governments eventually can enlist private information as behavioral
interventions to encourage GB compliance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Buildings can pose far-reaching environmental impacts,1 some of
which may be mitigated by setting standards to make the buildings
green. Green buildings (GBs) are those built in line with
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1. See Oswaldo Lucon et al., Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
675
(2014),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter9.pdf
(“In
2010
buildings accounted for 32% of total global final energy use, 19% of energy-related GHG
emissions (including electricity-related), approximately one-third of black carbon emissions, and
an eighth to a third of F-gases.”).
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environmentally protective standards.2 The number of GBs is growing
worldwide,3 and the GB movement owes its survival to the efforts of
various parties, including individuals, governments, and self-regulatory
agencies (SRA). Yet it is too soon to say that the GB movement has
reached its zenith, due to the challenges facing GB compliance. There
are four main challenges for the development of GB: the higher initial
cost, the lack of incentives, the unawareness of building stakeholders,
and the dispersion of stakeholders.4 Those challenges can boil down to
a matter of incentives and preferences shaped by an institutional
framework, which consists of rules and players possessing (imperfect)
information about GB. This article argues that the law, as part of the
institutional framework, precisely guides the institutions and
instruments that can play a role to create incentives and steer
preferences of stakeholders towards GB.
If the law matters in GB compliance, then one might consider how
the law may promote GB compliance. Scholars from various
theoretical perspectives have argued that a variety of instruments can
be used in environmental governance to deal with externalities and
other market failures.5 Given the fact that none of the instruments in
isolation is able to provide an optimal level of environmental
protection, increasingly mixes of instruments are advanced as the ideal
policy tool.6 As GB compliance promotes environmental protection, it

2. See MCGRAW-HILL CONSTR., WORLD GREEN BUILDING TRENDS 5 (2013),
http://naturalleader.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/WorldGreenBuildingTrendsSmartMarket
Report-2013-Final-Full.pdf (defining a green building as “a construction project that is either
certified under any recognized global green rating system or built to qualify for certification”);
See generally ROB WATSON, GREEN BUILDING: MARKET AND IMPACT REPORT 24–37 (2011),
http://www3.cec.org/islandora-gb/en/islandora/object/greenbuilding%3A66/datastream/OBJEN/view (listing the benefits of LEED buildings including reduced greenhouse gas emissions,
water efficiency, and energy efficiency).
3. DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, WORLD GREEN BUILDING TRENDS 2016: DEVELOPING
MARKETS
ACCELERATING
GLOBAL
GREEN
GROWTH
5
(2016),
http://fidic.org/sites/default/files/World%20Green%20Building%20Trends%202016%20Smart
Market%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
4. Id. at 18–19.
5. “The typical categories of market failures are the following: (a) lack of competition, most
prominently monopoly; (b) information problems, most importantly asymmetric information (but
also including uncertainty, bounded rationality, and different attitudes of risk; (c) missing
markets, including both negative externalities and public goods.” Alessio M. Pacces & Roger Van
den Bergh, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Regulation, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS: REGULATION AND ECONOMICS 5 (Alessio M. Pacces & Roger Van den
Bergh eds., 2d ed. 2012).
6. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 571–92
(2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS] (discussing the various structures of legal
intervention); Steven Shavell, The Corrective Tax Versus Liability as Solutions to the Problem of
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is likely that instruments for environmental compliance also work for
GB compliance. In practice, the U.S. government has contributed to
GB compliance through law and policy, using different instruments to
engage different stakeholders.7 In this way, the GB movement in the
United States not only survives but also thrives.8
The joint use of instruments is also what one can observe in
practice. Then, the question can be asked why the joint use makes
sense in theory. To advocate for the joint use of instruments for GB
promotion, this article proceeds as follows: after this introduction, this
article briefly explains what it means to build green and what specific
challenges are faced by green building (Part II). Next, this article
describes why, in theory, a mix of instruments might be better suited
than the use of one particular framework, from a law and economic
perspective (Part III). The types of instruments at work for
environmental compliance are classified into command-and-control,
market-based, and suasive instruments, most of which are run by
governments, individuals, or professional associations. However, none
of those instruments can be free from imperfect information, high
costs, private interests or the inaccuracy of measurement. Where
government failure, liability failure, and the failure of self-regulation
may occur, a joint effort is thus needed. Then this article considers the
instruments at work for GB compliance to examine which instruments

Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250–65 (2011) [hereinafter Shavell, The Corrective
Tax] (discussing the merits and demerits of corrective taxation, regulation, and imposition of
liability); Michael G. Faure, The Complementary Roles of Liability, Regulation, and Insurance in
Safety Management: Theory and Practice, 17 J. RISK RES. 689, 689–702 (2014) (discussing the
interaction of liability rules, regulation and insurance to address safety hazards); Daniel C. Esty,
Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental Regulation to 21st Century
Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1, 24–42, 59–63 (2017) (proposing a new incentive structure and
regulation framework to improve environmental policy).
7. See, e.g., Green Building Certification Systems for Federal Buildings, 79 Fed. Reg.
61,563–71 (Oct. 14, 2014) (codified at 10 C.F.R. §§ 433, 435, 436).
8. See generally BLDG. DESIGN + CONSTR., GREEN BUILDINGS AND THE BOTTOM LINE 1
(2006), http://www.lafarge-na.com/BD&C%20White%20Paper%2006.pdf (noting that green
building was seeing success in all construction markets); See also MCGRAW-HILL CONSTR.,
RESIDENTIAL
GREEN
BUILDING
SMARTMARKET
REPORT
4
(2006),
http://ferriercustomhomes.com/MHCResidentialGreenBuildingSmartMarketReport.pdf (“[B]y
2010, between 5% and 10% of new construction starts (both commercial and residential) will be
green projects.”). In the next couple of years the GB movement in the United States seemed to
be more robust than expected. By the year 2013, green building was “becoming standard practice
in the United States.” Even in the face of a downturn and in time of transition for the U.S.
economy, the number of GBs still increased dramatically between 2008 and 2011. MCGRAW-HILL
CONSTR., supra note 2, at 40. To date, “a strong shift to green is still evident in the US,” with
commercial and institutional owners, as well as consumers showing strong interests in building
green. DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 35.
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have been put in place and whether this constitutes a joint use (Part
IV). This article separately reviews some of the empirical evidence
concerning the effectiveness of the specific instruments (Part V). Part
VI concludes.
II. GREEN BUILDING AND ITS CHALLENGES
A. Key Elements of Green Building
GB compliance in its early times relied largely on technical
industry-made standards used to certify a building as green. The
commonly used GB rating systems, especially the Leadership on
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED),9 the Building Research
Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM)10 and
the Green Globe,11 identify the five principal elements of GB: energy
efficiency, land use, indoor air quality (IAQ), water use, and
construction/demolition (C/D) waste management. Performances on
the five elements should be reaped throughout a building’s lifecycle,
getting different stakeholders involved.12
Energy efficiency takes into account in-use energy and energy
embodied,13 oftentimes associated with greenhouse gas (GHG)
9. The LEED is an industry-based certification system established by the United States
Green Building Council (USGBC), who “works with government, member businesses and allied
organizations to support policies and programs that advance greener buildings and communities.”
About LEED, USGBC, https://www.usgbc.org/node/10119744 (last visited Sept. 25, 2018). As of
2016, LEED was the “the world’s most widely used green building rating system, with nearly
80,000 projects participating in LEED across 162 countries.” Cecilia Shutters & Robb Tufts,
LEED by the Numbers: 16 Years of Steady Growth, USGBC: LEED (May 27, 2016),
https://www.usgbc.org/articles/leed-numbers-16-years-steady-growth.
10. BREEAM was invented by the Building Research Establishment, which was a
government establishment devoted to the research for the construction and built environment
sectors in the UK. Our History, BRE GROUP, https://bregroup.com/about-us/our-history/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2018). The BREEAM is widely-used within the EU, taking up an 80% share of
the GB rating market. Why BREEAM, BREEAM, https://web.archive.org/web/
20160510021519/http://www.breeam.com/why-breeam (last visited May 11, 2016).
11. The Green Globes system was originally developed by ECD Energy and Environmental
Canada Ltd., which specializes in assessment and rating services. The Green Globes prevails
mainly in Canada and the U.S. as a self-assessment certification tool. About, GREEN GLOBES,
http://www.greenglobes.com/about.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
12. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, INTEGRATED PROJECT DELIVERY: A GUIDE 2–5 (2007),
http://info.aia.org/siteobjects/files/ipd_guide_2007.pdf; AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA GUIDE
BUILDING
LIFE
CYCLE
ASSESSMENT
IN
PRACTICE
9–10
(2010),
TO
http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/aia/documents/pdf/aiab082942.pdf.
13. See USGBC, LEED V4 FOR BUILDING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 66–68 (2016),
https://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/LEED%20v4%20BDC_07.2.18_current.pdf; T. IbnMohammed et al., Operational vs. Embodied Emissions in Buildings – A Review of Current
Trends, 66 ENERGY & BLDG. 232–45 (2013).
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emissions. Standards on land use require building work not to do harm
to properties in the vicinity or in areas of ecological concern, such as
wildlife habitats.14 In the meantime, GB compliance can be a way to
cure contaminated land (brownfields).15 IAQ standards promote the
safe exposure to chemicals released indoors, such as volatile organic
compounds (VOCs), and thus reduce sick building syndromes.16 Water
use is measured in terms of outdoor and indoor water use, e.g. water
used for gardens and appliances, or that consumed during construction
processes.17 C/D waste management usually goes through two
processes required in a rating system, one of which is to collect, sort
and store waste before delivering to disposal sites; another is landfill
diversion, which can be further grouped into waste disposal and
recovery treatment.
By its definition, GB compliance has gone beyond energy
efficiency and appears to be a mix of different environmental elements.
In other words, GB compliance is holistic in scope, integrative in
process, which hints at the challenges ahead.
B. Challenges
A higher initial cost has been reported as the top challenge facing
GB compliance.18 The higher initial cost of GB may be a result of highend GB technologies and materials (the “hard costs”) and the payment
for GB certifications (the “soft costs”).19 Yet it has been shown that
GBs are getting cheaper by virtue of increasing knowledge about GB
and a rising number of GB service suppliers.20 The obstacle of higher
14. See id. at 13 (listing avoidance of critical habitats as a construction requirement).
15. See id. at 14, 15 (listing Brownfield remediation activities as a construction requirement).
16. See, e.g., TOM TAYLOR & HELEN PINEO, BREEAM, HEALTH AND WELL-BEING IN
BREEAM 6 (2015), http://www.breeam.com/filelibrary/Briefing%20Papers/99427-BREEAMHealth—-Wellbeing-Briefing.pdf (noting that “[p]oor indoor air quality is likely to contribute to
Sick Building Syndrome”); USGBC, supra note 13, at 107–10 (detailing minimum indoor air
pollutant construction requirements).
17. See USGBC, supra note 13, at 51–65 (outlining multiple water consumption
requirements).
18. DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 18.
19. See WORLD GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR GREEN BUILDING: A
REVIEW OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR DEVELOPERS, INVESTORS AND OCCUPANTS 20
(2013),
http://www.worldgbc.org/files/1513/6608/0674/Business_Case_For_Green_Building_
Report_WEB_2013-04-11.pdf (defining hard costs and soft costs of building design and
construction).
20. See LISA FAY MATHIESSEN & PETER MORRIS, DAVIS LANGDON, COST OF GREEN
REVISITED: REEXAMINING THE FEASIBILITY AND COST IMPACT OF SUSTAINABLE DESIGN IN
THE LIGHT OF INCREASED MARKET ADOPTION 3 (2007), http://sustainability.ucr.edu/docs/leedcost-of-green.pdf (finding “no significant difference in average cost for green buildings as
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initial cost may be exacerbated by stakeholders’ misperception that
GBs are exclusively high-end projects. This could be the case in
jurisdictions where GB development is just looming on the horizon and
where there is imperfect information about GB.
The lack of incentives could be another reason why the GB
movement has not topped out in some areas.21 First of all, GB
compliance pays off slowly, which may lead stakeholders to be less
willing to pay given the higher initial cost.22 Though building green
costs more, as it happens either in reality or in perception, such costs
can be offset by the payoffs gained throughout a building’s life cycle.23
However, the payoffs may come in a marginal way over a long term,24
in which case end-users may overlook the benefits due to “rational
inattention.”25
Second, GB compliance calls for joint efforts from different
building stakeholders, but not all of them will make a move in the face
of split incentives.26 Those who invest in GBs may not be the immediate
beneficiaries of GB compliance.27 For instance, a GB developer may
pay for a high-end heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC)
compared to non-green buildings”); WORLD GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 8 (“While
there can be an additional costs associated with building green as compared to a conventional
building, the cost premium is typically not as high as is perceived by the development industry.”).
As a result, perceived higher initial costs are considered less of a challenge to GB construction
now than they once were. See DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 18 (showing that
“the percentage [of study participants] that consider [higher perceived first costs] a top challenge
has shrunk by 26 percentage points since 2012”).
21. See DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 19 (listing lack of political support or
incentives for green buildings as a top concern among developing countries).
22. See WORLD GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 29 (discussing life cycle cost
assessment as a tool to show the long-term payoffs for high initial costs of green buildings).
23. See id. at 19.
24. On global average, the payback period of building green is eight years, but this may differ
across jurisdictions. For instance the average payback period in China is six years versus seven to
eight years in the US. DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 6, 37, 43.
25. See James M. Sallee, Rational Inattention and Energy Efficiency, 57 J.L. & ECON. 781,
781–820 (2014) (“The idea behind rational inattention is that when information is costly to
acquire, decision makers may sometimes choose to act on incomplete information rather than
incur the cost to become perfectly in- formed.”).
26. See GRETCHEN CALCAGNI, HOUSEHOLD WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR IMPROVED
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S RENTAL HOUSING MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR ROCKY
MOUNTAIN
INSTITUTE’S
SUPEREFFICIENT
HOUSING
INITIATIVE
iv
(2012),
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5379/GC%20MP%20Final.pdf?se
quence=1 (showing that occupiers of larger rental units are willing to pay considerably more for
energy efficiency improvement than those who live in smaller units).
27. Cf. Jesse Melvin, The Split Incentives Energy Efficiency Problem: Evidence of
Underinvestment By Landlords, 115 ENERGY POL’Y 342, 342 (2018) (discussing how landlords
have little incentive to invest in energy saving technology when tenants pay for utilities).
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system to improve the energy efficiency of a building, though the
tenants who pay for energy bills actually benefit from the savings. In
that case, tenants prefer living in a GB as it provides them with a
financial benefit, but developers with “short-term investment
horizons” may not prefer GB development.28
Low public awareness also impedes GB compliance.29 Such lack of
awareness can result from the stakeholders’ misperceptions about
building green. First, GBs might be mistaken as high-end projects
rather than “business as usual” buildings, despite the rising
environmental awareness30 that has in some ways driven consumers to
purchase green products.31 Second, building stakeholders may not be
well-informed about the benefits of GB. For instance, in the case of
green leasing, landlords may show less willingness to carry out green
renovations due to the split incentive problem. However, such
unwillingness might be lessened if the landlords knew that GB
compliance can result in a higher rent or asset price of an office
building,32 which could make GB renovations cost-effective. Apart
from the cost-effectiveness, environmental benefits may render
building green an ethical choice, which has been one of the triggers that
raises GB activity level.33 Such an ethical motivation might resonate
with environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) but fail
to inspire individuals due to a “causal inefficacy.”34 Lastly, greening a
building is a “design-bid-use” process wherein GB suppliers and

28. See Avis Devine & Nils Kok, Green Certification and Building Performance: Implications
for Tangibles and Intangibles, 411 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 151, 158 (2015) (finding that “both
LEED and BOMA BEST certification lead to an increased probability of lease renewal”).
29. NINA KHANNA ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB, REPORT NO. LBNL 6609E,
COMPARATIVE POLICY STUDY FOR GREEN BUILDINGS IN U.S. AND CHINA 29 (2014),
https://china.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/green_buildings_policy_comparison.pdf; see DODGE DATA &
ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 43 (finding a lack of public awareness to be a challenge to green
building).
30. See DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 5, 18.
31. See Shu-Hui Lan & Tzu-Chun Sheng, The Study on Key Factors of Influencing
Consumers’ Purchase of Green Buildings, 7 INT’L BUS. RES. 49, 59 (2014) (“‘The awareness of
environmental protection’ is the secondary factor to impact the consumers to purchase the green
building.”).
32. Piet Eichholtz, The Economics of Green Building, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 50, 61 (2013).
33. See DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that viewing green building
as “the right thing to do” triggered construction of green buildings).
34. The idea of causal inefficacy in environmental ethics is that an individual is less likely to
take green actions, e.g. fixing up the energy efficient HVAC system, when s/he knows that the
action could make little difference in solving large-scale environmental problems, such as GHGs
emission reduction. See James Garvey, Climate Change and Causal Inefficacy: Why Go Green
When It Makes No Difference?, 69 ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPPLEMENTS 157, 157–58 (2011).
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consumers need to work together.35 Yet such coordination with
building professionals may be unlikely, since the building industry is
where the customers’ feedback matters least.36 In that case, the actual
users are less likely to use the GB in ways that can maximize the
benefits of GB if they are not well-informed by the building
professionals.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
From the above, it may be clear that green buildings could have
many social advantages and promote sustainability, but that there are
quite a few obstacles that explain why green building may not occur
spontaneously. This suggests a need for using legal instruments
(Subsection A). A variety of legal and policy instruments could be used
to promote green buildings. Each instrument has advantages and
disadvantages, and some may be better suited than others (Subsection
B). The specific problems of instruments used in isolation show the
need to develop a smart instrument mix to promote green building
(Subsection C). Subsection D concludes.
A. Why Law Matters
1. Law Shapes Change
GB compliance recasts the way human beings shape the built
environment and thus can be viewed as a novel change in response to
the environmental concerns around buildings. To create a novel
change, as North pointed out, one must know correctly the three
sources of a novel change: first, an increasing stock of knowledge,
demographics, and the institutional matrix;37 second, incorporation of

35. SUAT GUNHAM & YILMAZ HATIPKARASULN, AM. SOC’Y FOR ENG’G EDUC., AC 20123960, SCOPE OF PRECONSTRUCTION SERVICES IN GREEN BUILDING PROJECTS 3 (2012),
https://www.asee.org/file_server/papers/attachment/file/0002/2357/Scope_of_Preconstruction_
Services_in_Green_Building_Projects.pdf (discussing project delivery method choices for green
building projects, such as Design-Bid-Build, Construction Management at Risk, and Design-Build
and noting that “[t]here is no doubt that early contractor involvement in the decision making
process provides valuable contributions to the project and may significantly change the outcomes
including cost, quality and sustainability goals.”).
36. AMORY B. LOVINS, ENERGY EFFICIENT BUILDINGS: INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 30–31 (1994),https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/EnergyEfficient-Buildings-Institutional-Barriers-and-Opportunities.pdf (“[R]eal-estate developers
remain astonishingly isolated from direct and detailed customer feedback, and any system without
feedback is likely to make mistakes.”).
37. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGES 116–
17 (2005).
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the new knowledge into the belief systems of those who can make the
institutional arrangements;38 and third, alterations to the institutional
matrix composed of formal rules, prominently the law, informal
constraints, and the enforcement of the rules to induce desirable
outcomes.39
Among other factors, the institutional matrix shapes the incentive
structure, which can be altered accordingly to deal with the attributes
of public goods and the externalities and information problems that
cannot be fixed by the market itself.40 The Coase Theorem tells us that
the market can correct itself if property rights are perfectly assigned,
enforcement of contracts impose little to no transaction costs,
preferences are homogeneous, and parties are rational persons.41
Because these ideals do not exist in the real world, novel institutional
changes are needed to overcome the problems that cannot be solved
completely by the market.42
However, the alterations may not spontaneously take place, where
the rules and the players living on the existing institutional matrix may
collaborate to make the GB development overwhelmingly incremental
and path-dependent.43 As part of the institutional framework, law may
also affect the incentive structure on different levels. But lawmakers
should be aware that law cannot overcome all the challenges in a novel
situation, such as the limits of human knowledge or slowly changing
preferences. To deal with these challenges, law should not only provide
constitutional and collective rules that decide what is desirable for the
society but also put more weight on operational rules that lay out how
the collective decisions can be implemented. The operational rules
usually take the form of specific regulations or property and liability
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 49.
41. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON 1, 1–44 (1960).
This theory aside, a recent experimental result shows that property rights (absolute rights) may
not impact that much on efficiency as expected in theory. The experiment went by three
situations: a) there is an absolute property right, but it is initially given to the party who places
less value on it; b) the property is initially given to the party who values it more, but the other
party can take it without paying any price; c) if the two parties cannot reach a contract, the
property will be scraped and be worthless. The lab found that the three scenarios of bargaining
did not differ significantly in terms of efficiency and the price at which the conveyance occurred.
Of note, the game therein was played without considering any transaction costs and time limit
though, with only two parties involved. See Oren Bar-Gill & Christoph Engel, Bargaining in the
Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment, 59 J.L. & ECON. 477, 477–93 (2016).
42. NORTH, supra note 37, at 7.
43. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, TRANSACTION COSTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 10–13 (1992).
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rules and may have direct impacts on individual decision making.
Those individuals’ perceptions and mental models on risks,
uncertainties, and information may in turn affect the implementation
of rules.44 In other words, it is the interaction between the rules and the
players that makes a novel change happen incrementally, and
lawmakers should take into account how the players in the market
react to the rules, apart from formulating the rules carefully.
2. Law Provides Incentives
Law can spell out the incentive structure regarding who will build
green and for what purpose. Governments can use the law to mandate
GB compliance and to impose punishment; elsewhere, the incentives
can take the form of tax reductions, subsidies, funds, or an emissions
trading system that can lead to financial benefits or losses. Also, the
law can shape the incentive structure through property rules and
liability rules.45
For instance, GB compliance can require a reuse of brownfields
that have been left in the public domain.46 However, land reclamation
is not without costs and the parties at stake may not take measures
spontaneously, particularly in the face of a state property regime. The
state property regime is when the ownership of a property resides with
the citizenry at large while the management of the property is
controlled by the government. If the government fails to take care, a
possible result of contaminated land would be “de jure state property,
but de facto open access,”47 which may lead to the “tragedy of the

44. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 103 (2005).
45. The idea is that, on the one hand, the allocation of entitlements may affect the ways in
which resources are used. On the other hand, liability rules may affect stakeholders’ level of care
or the level of activity. Property rules and liability rules may have different implications, taking
into account which is a party of transaction costs. Generally, property rules can score better than
liability rules in protecting possessive rights, as property rules reduce the need of bargaining. Put
differently, the owner of the property does not need to bargain with all the potential takers if s/he
places more value on the property. When the takers are likely to do harm to the entitlement of
the property, the owner can use injunctive remedies. By contrast, there is a prima facie case
showing that liability may be superior to address harmful externalities, particularly when
bargaining is impossible or/and the state has imperfect information about individual acts. In that
case, the victim tends to sue the injurer for damages when the harm was done. This general idea
can be further reflected in five case scenarios where the different rules interplay to assign
entitlements and address pollution. For a more detailed discussion on the implications of the two
rules see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713–90 (1996). See also Daniel W. Bromley, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Environmental Economics, 12 J. ECON. ISSUES 43, 43–60 (1978).
46. See USGBC, supra note 13.
47. Daniel W. Bromley, The Commons, Common Property and Environmental Policy, 2
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commons.” Hence some have proposed lender liability as a vicarious
liability to promote GB compliance on brownfields.48
3. Law Shapes Preferences
Law as part of the institutional framework may in a broader sense
deliver the knowledge to the public and steer preferences. The real
world is a mix of both competitive situations and social dilemmas, in
which players need to take institutions seriously as not all individuals
in all situations are self-interested rational egoists.49 Different
stakeholders may have different reasons to comply, such as economic
rationality, situational rationality, and habits or reputation.50 Normfollowing individuals take into account other people’s interests as well
as their own.51 It is likely that parties choose to comply with a rule
simply because it is the rule. If GB compliance becomes part of the law,
law-abiding parties will pursue GB.
Equally important is the way in which law works with individual
perceptions and behavior to impact the effectiveness of legal
intervention. Individuals may act upon intrinsic motivations related to
how they prefer to behave,52 and social norms may lead players to
behave in a certain way, on account of how strongly they value
compliance with a norm.53 In general, consumers’ choices for green
products, such as GBs and hybrid cars, may have more to do with social
norms than changes in relative prices.54
It has also been shown that external intervention via monetary
incentives or punishments are likely to affect intrinsic motivation in
two ways. On the one side, external intervention may crowd-out

ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 1, 13 (1992).
48. Darren A. Prum, Greenbacks for Building Green: Does a Lender for Sustainable
Construction Projects Need to Make Adjustments to Its Current Practices?, 43 ENVTL. L. 415, 432–
33 (2013).
49. OSTROM, supra note 44, at 127–31.
50. Some studies have shown that individuals as well as firms can have different motivations
to comply with laws and regulations. Sometimes corporations are motivated by economic
rationality. For instance, in a game with regulators, firms are said to cooperate in order to
minimize regulatory costs. Other times, corporations and/or executives choose to comply because
they value their reputations, or because of a sense of social responsibilities and conformity with
the rules. See Kevin Marechal, Not Irrational But Habitual: The Importance of “Behavioral Lockin” in Energy Consumption, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1104, 1104–14 (2010).
51. OSTROM, supra note 44, at 112.
52. Id.
53. Id at 127–29.
54. WILLIAM J. CONGDON, JEFFREY R. KLING & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, POLICY AND
CHOICE: PUBLIC FINANCE THROUGH THE LENS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 113 (2011).
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intrinsic motivations if the individuals affected see them as controlling,
in which case self-determination and self-esteem suffer.55 On the other
side, external interventions can also crowd-in intrinsic motivation if the
individuals concerned perceive it to be supportive.56 The motivation
crowding theory also has some implications in environmental
governance, for which the effect of pricing instruments remains in
doubt. For instance, a study has shown that subsidization policy may
have a negative effect on innovation and entrepreneurship.57 This may
signal that, apart from controlling as a way of external interventions,
the government can also work to the intrinsic motives of individuals,
using persuasion or nudges, as is the case with the Opower program in
the United States.58
B. Instruments
There are a variety of instruments that could be used to promote
GB. One example is voluntary industry standards, also known as selfregulation. As mentioned in the introduction, even the definition of
self-regulation is largely based on industry standards. However,
notwithstanding the traditional importance of self-regulation, this
article does not discuss self-regulation in the framework of legal
instruments because self-regulation is not mandated by law.59 Because
self-regulation in the form of voluntary industry standards has not
sufficiently led to the promotion of GB, other types of government
intervention may be necessary. This article argues below that precisely
the insufficiency of self-regulation is one of the reasons why it is
necessary to look for a smart mix that combines legal and policy
instruments.60
The traditional distinction made in the literature on instrument
choice is between the so-called command and control instruments (1),
market-based instruments (2) and suasive instruments (3). This article
discusses each in turn as well as their potential to play a role in green
building.

55. See Bruno S. Frey, How Intrinsic Motivation is Crowded out and in, 6 RATIONALITY &
SOC’Y 334, 334–52 (1994).
56. See id.
57. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical
Evidence, 15 J. ECON. SURV’S. 589, 589–611 (2000).
58. See infra Part IV.C, Part V.
59. In some cases, government regulation may require compliance with voluntary industry
standards, in which case there is a hybrid between government and self-regulation.
60. See infra Part III.C and accompanying footnotes.
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1. Command-and-Control
The command-and-control instruments are used as direct
governmental interventions.61 The command-and-control approach
takes the form of mandates, in which case noncompliance with
standards leads to punishment imposed by governments.62 Examples
include licensing, planning, and permitting, most of which are ex ante
in character.63
The license may come as a wholesale approval on all the elements
of a GB, where the government may require a submission of green
building documents, such as a checklist before issuing land use
entitlements or a construction permit.64 Other times, the GB features
may be individually reviewed during the licensing process on each
environmental element, such as a license on producing tolerable
construction noise,65 a license to dispose chemical waste,66 or an annual
license for construction and demolition debris landfill.67
GB compliance can also be used in land-use planning or zoning.
Land use for large-scale projects and urban development can pose farreaching environmental impacts, where the GB can play a part to
reduce those impacts. There are two basic ways in which the GB
development may affect land planning and zoning. First, a GB may
bring environmental benefits such as a more efficient transportation
network that reduces tailpipe emissions or the redevelopment of
brownfields.68 Land use for GB development can be planned within the
local boundary69 and incorporated into an “extra-local” urban
61. Wallace E. Oates & William J. Baumol, The Instruments for Environmental Policy, in
THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 91, 101–04 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1996).
62. ALFRED ENDRES, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 108–09 (2011).
63. See, e.g., Beatriz Junquera & Jesús Ángel Del Brío, Preventive Command and Control
Regulation: A Case Analysis, 8 SUSTAINABILITY art. 99, at 1–4 (2016) (analyzing the effects of
preventive command-and-control environmental regulation in the automotive industry).
64. Stephen R. Miller, Enforcement of Local Green Building Ordinances Integrating Third
Party Rating Systems, 27 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 54, 61 (2009).
65. How to Complete and Submit Construction Noise Permit (CNP) Application Forms,
ENVTL. PROT. DEP’T OF THE GOV’T OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, ENVT’L
PROT.
DEP’T:
GUIDANCE
NOTES
FOR
LICENCE
APPLICATION,
https://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/application_for_licences/guidance/cnp.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2018).
66. See Waste Disposal Ordinance (2015) Cap. 354, § 3–8 (H.K.).
67. See
OHIO
EPA,
Construction
and
Demolition
Debris
(C&DD),
http://www.epa.ohio.gov/dmwm/Home/C-DD.
68. See USGBC, supra note 13, at 12, 15.
69. For instance, the Boston Zoning Code was amended in 2007 to require that all projects
subject to the city’s Large Project Review process should be certified by the LEED system. BOS.,
MASS., ZONING CODE §§ 37-1–8 (2018).
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development.70 Also planning for GB development may keep buildings
off a piece of land where they may cause inevitable or irreversible
environmental harm.71
2. Market-based Instruments
Market-based instruments avail financial incentives or
disincentives, which induce the desirable level of care or the level of
activity. Yet none of the market-based instruments in isolation can
achieve the desirable care and activity levels simultaneously.72
Instruments of this type could take the form of liability,73 subsidies,
taxation, or public procurements.
Liability for indoor air pollution and land contamination can
provide incentives for GB compliance. Poor IAQ may lead to sick
building syndrome (SBS) or building-related illness.74 Those who suffer
from the exposure may file a suit on the basis of negligence,

70. For instance, China and Singapore had made joint efforts into an eco-city project known
as the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city (“中新天津生态城”), where all buildings within the city
meet GB standards via integrated design. Further details on the project will be provided in the
China chapter. See Singapore Government, Tianjin Eco-city: Introduction, SINO-SINGAPORE
TIANJIN
ECO-CITY:
A
MODEL
FOR
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.tianjinecocity.gov.sg/bg_intro.htm (last updated Aug. 25, 2017).
71. See infra note 197 (Part IV, Section A. at 23).
72. For instance, a study shows that taxation and liability differ in their ways of affecting the
level of care or level of activity. In cutting down pollution, a corrective tax may score better than
liability as a means of controlling general pollution when the quantity of pollution determines the
harm. This is because corrective tax may not affect the parties’ level of care as it is levied based
on expected harm and fixed tax rate, which means once the parties get involved, there is rarely an
excuse for parties not to pay. Strict liability can also help reduce the level of activity by the same
token. By contrast, negligence may give the injurer an escape as long as she takes due care in
preventing the harm, where the liability of negligence can help higher the level of care. See
generally Shavell, The Corrective Tax, supra note 6.
73. Liability can be thought of as a market-based approach, since it has little to say ex ante
about what the standards on emissions are and what measures should be taken to meet the
standards. In that case, parties on the market can make their own decisions based on the given
incentives, and the information about harm and acts will be largely possessed by private parties.
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 575–76 (2004).
74. The term “sick building syndrome” (SBS) is used to describe situations in which building
occupants experience acute health effects that appear to be linked to time spent in a building, but
no specific illness or cause can be identified. By contrast, the term “building related illness” (BRI)
is used when symptoms of diagnosable illness are identified and can be attributed directly to
airborne building contaminants. In the case of BRI, building occupants complain of symptoms
associated with acute discomfort, e.g., headache; eye, nose, or throat irritation; dry cough; dry or
itchy skin; dizziness and nausea; difficulty in concentrating; fatigue; and sensitivity to odors. See
EPA, AIR AND RADIATION 6609J, INDOOR AIR FACTS NO. 4: SICK BUILDING SYNDROME
(1991), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-08/documents/sick_building_factsheet.
pdf.
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constructive evictions, or worker’s compensation.75 Yet the IAQrelated liability may be understated in environmental law, which
mainly deals with outdoor air quality.76
Liability for contaminated land can be another way to encourage
GB compliance. The transportation, storage, usage, and disposal of
building materials and construction wastes are likely to cause harm to
land. In a suit against the injurer, liability for land contamination
caused by waste disposal does not differ much from the traditional
environmental tort liability.77
In recent decades, lender liability has been prevalent in the US.
Lenders who grant loans to building projects may be responsible for
the damages on land reclamation.78 Liability is mostly harm-based and
deals more with negative externalities.79 In that sense, liability is
generally a difficult instrument to promote GB performance in a way
that generates positive externalities, such as energy efficiency.80 The
positive externalities problem usually lays the ground for public goods
provision, regulation, or subsidies.81
Subsidies primarily serve to cover the higher cost of GB
compliance. GB compliance can be costly and may not pay off in the

75. See infra Part IV.B, Subsection 4 (Liability).
76. For instance, in the U.S., the Clean Air Act (CAA) and other federal legislation do not
have much to say about indoor air quality (IAQ). See Pub. L. No. 88-206 (1963), 77 Stat. 392
(codified at 42 U.S.C.ch. 85, subch. I § 7401 et seq.). A bill of the “Radon Gas and Indoor Air
Quality Research Act of 1990” was once introduced in the 101st Congress, but it failed to be
passed in the end. Despite its failure, the expected bill aimed to establish in the Environmental
Protection Agency a program of research on indoor air quality, and tried to provide a
nontraditional approach was attempted via public information and technical assistance program.
See All Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R.5155 - Indoor Air Quality Act of 1990, U.S.
CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-bill/5155/all-info (last visited
February 2017).
The USEPA and OSHA provide guidance and information on IAQ management, yet do not
regulate IAQ through laws and regulations. See OSHA, INDOOR AIR QUALITY IN COMMERCIAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDINGS, OSHA 3430-04 2011, https://www.osha.gov/Publications/
3430indoor-air-quality-sm.pdf (last visited February 2017); Indoor Air Quality, USEPA,
https://www.epa.gov/indoor-air-quality-iaq (last visited February 2017).
77. See infra Part IV.B, Subsection 4 (Liability).
78. See generally Prum, supra note 48.
79. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 45.
80. In recent years, a “negative liability” on positive externalities has been suggested,
whereby those who produce benefits would be paid a compensatory award by the gainers. As a
matter of law, the negative liability has already existed in the law of restitutions; in a few cases,
tort law also supports the negative liability through liability on non-feasance by punishing the
failure to produce a positive externality. See generally Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative
Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21 (2009).
81. Id.
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short run, so private stakeholders, developers among others, may not
be willing to bear the higher initial cost. On that account, some
governments provide the stakeholders with subsidies to promote GB
compliance. Subsidies can take different forms. In some cases,
subsidies will be granted in proportion to the floor-space areas of a
building.82 In another way, a subsidy program may require a building
to be certified by a referred rating system.83
Taxation can also be used to encourage GB compliance.
Governments may award tax reductions on properties certified as
green84or levy taxes on non-green properties or activities. A typical
example is the Pigouvian tax as an attempt to internalize negative
environmental externalities.85 Taxation in this way can advance
compliance with a certain GB element, such as a tax on construction
wastes disposal.
Finally, by means of green public procurement, governments can
use their purchasing power to buy building services or products with
less environmental impacts, which may help to jump-start GB
compliance.86 GPP can directly increase GB demand in the short run.87
In the long run, GPP is likely to make building professionals and
customers better aware of GB compliance88 and hence may indirectly
encourage more private parties to engage in GB.
82. NINA NIRVANA ET AL., COMPARATIVE POLICY STUDY FOR GREEN BUILDINGS IN U.S.
AND CHINA, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY REPORT NO. LBNL-6609E 44
(2014), https://china.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/green_buildings_policy_comparison.pdf.
83. For instance, in the state of Pennsylvania, a subsidy scheme for schools has been
programmed by the government to cover the soft costs of building information modeling, green
consultancy & designing, and the certification of the LEED. For more information about the
program see the U.S. Department of Energy, High Performance Green School Planning Grant,
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/schools/13838/funding_opportunities/5
88215 (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
84. For example, in Baltimore, Maryland, the county council passed a bill stating that new
residential construction projects would earn 40%, 60%, and 100% property tax credits for Silver,
Gold, and Platinum buildings respectively. See BALT., MD., COUNTY CODE, § 11-2-203.2.
85. William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21–
22 (1988).
86. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP), SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT: A GLOBAL REVIEW, UNEP FINAL REPORT, 16–24 (Dec. 2013),
http://www.unep.org/resourceefficiency/Portals/24147/SPP_Full_Report_Dec2013_v2%20NEW
%20(2).pdf.
87. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BUYING GREEN: A HANDBOOK ON
GREEN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, 4 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/pdf/BuyingGreen-Handbook-3rd-Edition.pdf.
88. Timothy Simcoe & Michael W. Toffel, Government Green Procurement Spillovers:
Evidence from Municipal Building Policies in California, 68 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 413
(2014).
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3. Suasive Instruments
The suasive instruments can be taken as information-based tools,
using behavioral interventions and private enforcement to promote
voluntary compliance.89
Environmental information disclosure (EID) can be required
from, or provided for, stakeholders to reduce environmental
externalities. EID has been used in environmental governance,
especially in developing economies where there is a mismatch between
the costs and effectiveness of traditional regulatory instruments.90
Normatively, access to environmental information is a fundamental
right laid down in international environmental conventions,91 while
instrumentally, EID proves its value in changing behaviors92 and
helping stakeholders make more sensible decisions related to
environmental quality.93 The law of EID usually enunciates the
content, the potential providers and receivers, the way the information
will be delivered, and exceptions.
Another suasive instrument could be voluntary environmental
agreements (VEAs). They are gaining popularity,94 and can be used
either in isolation or in conjunction with other instruments.95 A VEA
89. Oates & Baumol, supra note 61, at 108–09.
90. WORLD BANK, GETTING TO GREEN—A SOURCEBOOK OF POLLUTION MANAGEMENT
POLICY
TOOLS
FOR
GROWTH
AND
COMPETITIVENESS
123–24
(2012),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/560021468330349857/pdf/716080WP0Box370Gettin
g0to0Green0web.pdf.
91. As stated in the Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
“Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous
materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by
making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings,
including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” U.N. Conference on Environment &
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, ¶ 29–30, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (June 3, 1992).
92. See, e.g., Mark Stephan, Environmental Information Disclosure Programs: They Work,
But Why? 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 190-200 (2002).
93. See, e.g., YANHONG JIN, ET. AL., WORLD BANK DEV. GRP.: ENVT. & ENERGY TEAM,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE RATING AND DISCLOSURE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
OF CHINA’S GREEN WATCH PROGRAM (2010), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/497841468011137982/pdf/WPS5420.pdf.
94. See generally Allen Blackman et al., Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Developing
Countries: The Colombian Experience, 46 POL’Y SCI. 335 (2013) (using Colombian examples of
voluntary agreements between environmental regulators and polluters to examine trends in the
popularity of these agreements in the developing world).
95. See OECD, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
EFFECTIVENESS,
EFFICIENCY
AND
USAGE
IN
POLICY
MIXES
12
(2003),
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can be taken as “an agreement or action of self-regulation which is
voluntary in character, that involves stakeholders of which at least one
is the state.”96 By its definition, a VEA may differ from a commandand-control or a market-based instrument in the following ways.
First, a VEA is voluntary, so they do not require mandatory
participation or impose penalties for non-performance.97 In this way,
the enforcement of a VEA may largely rely on self-regulation and
employ the least governmental intervention compared to other
instruments.98 In that sense, a VEA is not legally binding, as opposed
to a green public procurement contract.99
Second, a VEA is an agreement in which at least one of the
negotiating parties should be a governmental agency.100 A VEA can be
reached between the industry and the regulator, with environmental
NGOs occasionally getting involved as a third-party.101 A unilateral
commitment made by the industry is strictly speaking not a VEA.102 A
VEA can take the form of formal documents such as a memorandum
and may at times entail some “informal understandings” whereby the
government may informally agree not to invoke regulations later.103
Lastly, a VEA may oftentimes be used in conjunction with
environmental regulations. On the one hand, it could be formalized on
the basis of the objectives and instruments in environmental laws and
policies. On the other hand, a VEA can be an experimental response
to a new environmental issue, whereby it may lay the foundation for
regulations to come.104
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/C08-0098-OECD-Voluntary.pdf.
96. Betty Gebers, The Diversity of Environmental Agreements: An International Overview,
in CO-OPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE AGREEMENTS AS A
POLICY STRATEGY 91, 93 (Pieter Glasbergen ed., 1998).
97. Id.
98. Panagiotis Karamanos, Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Evolution and Definition
of a New Environmental Policy Approach, 44 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 67, 68 (2001).
99. Id.
100. Gebers, supra note 96, at 93–94.
101. Karamanos, supra note 98, at 68–75.
102. Here we adopt a narrow meaning of VEA, upholding that an agreement should at least
include two or more parties. Yet there are conflicting views on the typology of VEA, where some
researchers may see the unilateral commitment made by firms as a VEA too. See Thomas P. Lyon
& John W. Maxwell, Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Regulation, in ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 75, 76 (Maurizio Frazini & Antonio Nicita eds.,
2002) (identifying unilateral commitments as a type of VEA).
103. Matthieu Glachant, The Setting of Voluntary Agreements between Industry and
Government: Bargaining and Efficiency, 3 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T. 43, 43–49 (1994).
104. For instance, there has been a study showing that the “reg-negs” (the “negotiated rulemaking”) between various groups led to the design of administrative rules based on the
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C. The Need for a Smart Mix
The three types of instruments differ in time (i.e. before or after),
form (i.e. monetary or non-monetary sanctions), and enforcement
level (i.e. public or private enforcement).105 Yet each of these
instruments is susceptible to imperfect information, private interests,
the inaccuracy of measurement, and ineffectiveness. Because no
instrument in isolation can overcome all of the challenges impeding
environmental compliance, a joint use of instruments makes sense.
This article illustrates the need to develop a mix of instruments by
first pointing out the limits of government in promoting green building.
Next, this article argues that one market-based instrument discussed
above, liability rules, likely has a limited applicability to green building.
Finally, this article identifies the limits of self-regulation, which cannot
on its own internalize environmental externalities in an optimal
manner.
1. Government Failure
Promoting GB compliance depends on governmental
involvement, but governments may face issues of over-action or
inaction (government failure).106 First of all, governments may not
always respond swiftly to environmental problems. This could be a
result of regulatory inflexibility or environmental uncertainty. On one
hand, governmental intervention by its nature allows less flexibility in
order to protect properties from takings or to avoid the misuse of
public power.107 On the other hand, where there is uncertainty, reckless
regulation appears to be a disease rather than a cure against the
disease.108

involvement and consensus between the interested parties. DAVID WALLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: STRATEGIES IN EUROPE, THE US AND JAPAN 112–15
(1995).
105. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 572–74.
106. Barak Orbach, What is Government Failure?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 44, 45 (2013).
107. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that protecting property is the very purpose of government, and
the nonconsensual taking of property undermines that duty).
108. For instance, there has been a study showing that where the public has an inaccurate
perception of the risks posed by hazardous waste sites, the housing prices will be adversely
affected. Then the question arises to what extent the government should address risks that may
not be real but “have significant economic consequences in that markets may react to perceptions
rather than actual risks.” W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 591, 599 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007).
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Second, some of the instruments are too costly.109 Such costs
include the amount delivered to the market, as is the case with
subsidies or public procurements. Also included are the administrative
costs paid to run the institutions and organizations for GB compliance,
and the amount may increase for long-term monitoring and
enforcement.
Third, governments do not always have enough information to
define the optimal level of intervention. For instance, the use of a
subsidy conceives of the market as a lens through which the socially
desirable volume of goods can be seen,110 in which case governments
may struggle to decide when to cease the subsidy and whether the GB
market can function well without the subsidies. After all, a subsidy is
just a means to an end and not an end in itself. In the case of taxation,
the information problem may also lead to the inaccuracy of the
variables of a tax based on expected outcomes.111
Last, and by no means least, environmental quality is of public
interest, and it may be illusory to say that governments always act on
public interest. Though the government as an organization is the actor,
individuals within government make decisions. For those individuals,
however, “the public interest is mixed with, and is often at odds with,
their private and special interest.”112 Chances are that the outcomes of
governmental intervention may deviate from the public interest when
officials pursue their own agenda.113
2. Liability Failure
Liability is meant to deter and compensate environmental harm.
But in the case of environmental compliance, the liability regime may
fail to provide the correct incentives when it under-deters or undercompensates, or when there are alternatives to make the environment
better off than just to deter or compensate on a case-by-case basis.
First, not all environmental harm can be detected and proved.
Sometimes there is not a particular victim to file the suit. Even if a
victim can be found, the liability system imposes administrative costs
109. See Charles Wolf Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation
Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 124–26 (1979) (discussing how a perceived harm by the public can
lead opportunistic political agents to enact redundant or excessive regulation).
110. Julian Le Grand, The Theory of Government Failure, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 423, 438
(1991).
111. See Shavell, The Corrective Tax, supra note 6, at 253–55 (discussing the problems of
employing corrective taxes).
112. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 42 (1955).
113. Le Grand, supra note 110, at 435.
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on the litigants and the state.114 In the face of high costs, more than one
dollar is spent getting one dollar in compensation. As a result, the
caseload may fall below the desirable level when the victims do not
take into account the social positive externalities resulting from
litigation to compensate ecological losses or deter potential injurers.115
Other times, the causation can be hard to prove when there is a
lag in time between acts and harm (the “long-tail damage”).116 The
causation cannot be set aside in holding parties liable, as liability for
minimal harm or without regard to causation will lead parties to take
excessive care or to quit the market.117 Given the uncertainty around
causation, the liability regime may avail some rules that reflect such
uncertainty, one of which could be the preponderance-of-evidence
standard of proof.118 Yet the preponderance standard may not yield the
desirable level of care or activity, at least under strict liability.119 At
some point the preponderance standard may even work worse when
coupled with proportionate damages.120
Furthermore, being ex post in character, liability may not excel at
addressing environmental risks or uncertainty. The liability regime is
mostly harm-based, which means it can be enlisted only after the harm

114. Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 139,
151 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
115. Id. at 152.
116. Faure, supra note 6, at 696.
117. Shavell, supra note 114, at 162.
118. The preponderance rule is when a defendant is held liable only if the probability that the
defendant caused the loss is over 50%. Id. at 162–63.
119. The reason behind this is that the injurer may have no incentive to avoid causing injury
if he knows that in any case the possibility that he is the cause of loss will never reach 50%; in a
similar vein, if the injurer finds that by no means can he reduce the possibility of being liable, he
may not take into account the level of care and increase the product price to cover the potential
legal costs. Additionally, the uncertainty around causation may also avail injurers an escape hatch
when proximate causation is applied. Where there are atypical or unforeseeable factors
interwoven with each other, the injurer may flee from the liability because he is not the proximate
cause of loss. But what is foreseeable and what is not will be ruled by the courts, which will
probably reduce the incentives of injurers to be informed. Id. at 162–64.
120. Proportionate damages here means damages reduced to reflect uncertainty. For instance,
if there is 70% chance that the injurer is liable, the damages will be discounted by 30%. There is
a study showing that, all else being equal, all-or-nothing damages can do better than the
proportionate damages in inducing compliance ex ante; in other words, it would not reduce the
deterrence of liability as proportionate damages do. This spells out why the all-or-nothing
damages are more commonly used in most of the existing legal systems, in tandem with the
preponderance-of-evidence standard of proof. See Shmuel Leshem & Geoffrey P. Miller, All-orNothing Versus Proportionate Damages, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 345–72 (2009) (comparing the
two different damage systems and concluding that all-or-nothing damages create a higher rate of
compliance).
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occurs.121 But there might be a time when the outcomes of an activity
are uncertain or less than obvious,122 and it may be too late or too costly
to cure when negative consequences result. In that case, a preventive
measure would be preferable in light of the precautionary principle,
which seems to be less available in the liability regime.
Even if the environmental harm could be successfully detected
and proved, the remedies might not always cover the actual losses
(under-compensation). This is in part due to an inaccurate
measurement on environmental harm, especially when it comes to
irreversible harm. Although scientific economics can provide some
measurement tools, such as the hedonic pricing method (HPM) or the
contingent value method (CVM), these methods are not free from
bias,123 and they might be accused of undermining the intrinsic value of
non-human beings.
Additionally, liability undercompensates when a liable party is
judgment-proof or unable to pay the damages.124 One of the solutions
to the judgment-proof problem is to seek vicarious liability, in which
case parties other than actual injurers, such as lenders of project

121. See Shavell, The Corrective Tax, supra note 6, at 258 (discussing how legal liability for
harm can deter potential injurers, but cannot punish them for risks they take until that harm
materializes).
122. Particularly with regard to public health, ex post punishment and investigation may be
insufficient remedies. In 2016, almost 500 students at a high school near Shanghai, China, had
been diagnosed with sickness as the school’s new campus located closely to three chemical plants
that produced pesticides. The diagnoses ranged from bronchitis and dermatitis to lymphoma and
leukemia. The construction permit was granted before a safety assessment was done, at which
point nobody was aware of the potential health threat. However, after the outbreak of disease, a
separate survey found dangerous amounts of toxic substances, including the chlorobenzene levels
that were 78,899 times the safe level in soil, as well as a cocktail of heavy metals such as mercury,
cadmium, and lead. See Zhang Chun, Changzhou Pollution Scandal Highlights Holes in China’s
Environmental Enforcement, CHINADIALOGUE (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.chinadialogue.net/
article/show/single/en/8892-Changzhou-pollution-scandal-highlights-holes-in-China-senvironmental-enforcement.
123. For example, the HPM only captures people’s willingness to pay for perceived
differences in environmental attributes, and their direct consequences. Yet if people are not
aware of the linkages between the environmental attributes and benefits to them or their
property, the value will not be reflected in home prices. In the case of CVM, the measurement
may also fall victim to bias when individuals do not necessarily have a strong incentive to think
seriously about their answer, or there is a lack of detailed information framing within the
contingent scenario the component of willingness to pay questions. See SCOTT J. CALLAN &
JANET M. THOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT: THEORY, POLICY AND
APPLICATIONS 160–65 (6th ed., 2013).
124. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Cleanup and Liability After
Environmental Harmful Discharges, 16 RES. LAW & ECON. 17, 22 (Richard O. Zerbe Jr. ed.,
1994).
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developers, could be held liable.125 But the vicarious liability may
worsen the moral hazard126 and render the level of activity too high.127
Moreover, limitations on damages may also result in undercompensation. A statutory or contractual limitation may cap or exempt
damages.128 As such, the liability regime that avails insufficient
damages may lead to a too low level of care and a too high level of
activity.129
Liability insurance may ease the under-compensation problem
and in turn lead to under-deterrence.130 Insurability issues aside,
shifting the burden to parties other than the actual injurers will lead to
moral hazard, as is the case for the vicarious liability.131 In the case of
moral hazard, the actual injurer’s incentive to take precautions
decreases as he knows that others will bear the damages. In that case,
liability may fail to pose ex ante deterrence on the potential
wrongdoers.132
125. Shavell, supra note 114, at 171–72.
126. See Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environmental
Risk, 55 J. RISK & INS. 75, 80 (1988) (discussing how joint and several liability can exacerbate
moral hazard by spreading risk across an industry and not the defendant who is actually
responsible).
127. For instance, lender liability under CERCLA has been shown to “have the unintended
effect of increasing the frequency of accidents” under some circumstances. See Rohan Pitchford,
How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 1171, 1183 (1995) (concluding that “with judgment-proof firms and
noncontractible precaution, increasing liability of outsider creditors such as lenders could have
the unintended effect of increasing the frequency of accidents”).
128. For instance, some building professionals would add an exemption clause to a contract
so as to be free from the new standard of care required by GB performance. See AM. INST. OF
ARCHITECTS, Doc. A-201-2007, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR
CONSTRUCTION §15.1.6 (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.hba.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/B-2AIA-Doc-A201-2007.pdf (detailing contract terms for a waiver of damages between owners and
contractors).
129. Shavell, supra note 114, at 165.
130. The idea of liability insurance is that a potential injurer can buy ex ante insurance from
an insurance company, meaning that once the injurer is held liable for harm, the insurer will pay
for the damages per coverage written down in the insurance policy. Recently a type of liability
insurance for GB professionals has come into play, hoping that a reduction on occupational risks
can encourage those risk-averse building professionals to act upon GB standards. See generally
David J. Hatem, Green and Sustainable Design Part I: Professional Liability Risk and Insurability
Issues for Design Professionals, DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION MGMT. PROF. REP. 2 (2010)
(discussing “professional liability risk and insurability” issues for design professionals associated
with green and sustainable design); Darren A. Prum, Green Building Liability: Considering the
Applicable Standard of Care and Strategies for Establishing a Different Level by Agreement, 8
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 33, 61–62 (2012) (“After the owner, the design professional’s situation sits
squarely at the intersection of all stakeholders in a green building project.”).
131. Shavell, supra note 114, at 150.
132. Certainly the insurers can encourage the insured to raise their level of care or activity by
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Apart from the moral hazard problem, there are other ways in
which liability insurance might water down the liability regime. It is
likely that liability insurance will become a de facto element of tort
when widely used over time.133 As a result, liability suits will be fettered
by liability insurance in terms of damages and coverage.134 On the one
hand, the amount of damages ruled by courts rarely exceeds the policy
limit, where the insurers become the only party that pay for the loss.135
That could exacerbate the moral hazard risk. As such, it is
understandable that only suits are brought against insured injurers
since those guarantee effective payment. Tort suits beyond the
insurance coverage therefore are not regularly presented to the
courts.136
Lastly, the liability regime alone may not wield total control over
environmental quality. The liability regime deters and compensates
case-by-case and may not serve the whole picture well. Being ad hoc in
implication, liability can be less workable to resolve trans-boundary
environmental problems. For instance, if GHG reduction is supposed
to be one of the goals of GB compliance, there must be some minimum
standards on energy efficiency; otherwise, the reduction reaped in one
building will likely be evaporated by the emissions from other less
energy-efficient buildings, since GHGs can circulate in the air. Under
the liability regime, however, the standard of care determined by the
court can be applied only to specific situations.137
fixing the premiums. Yet doing so requires the insurers to have good information about the
injurers’ level of care, which may sometimes be too costly to get, and thus be the reason to provide
flat insurance regardless of the risk potential at an individual level. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics
and The Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 319 (1990).
133. In some for-compensation suits, there is a tendency for lawyers to strongly consider the
defendant’s ability to pay or the mechanism that can be used to compel the defendant to pay,
followed by the concerns about damages and proof of liability. Insurance has a fundamental effect
on the decision to sue since the insurance company might be the only party that can afford the
damages given the escape hatch availed by liability regime, the liquidation of assets in bankruptcy
proceedings, and the huge costs of mass environmental harm. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance
as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS.
L.J. 1, 4–5 (2005) (“Given the extent of consumer debt, the availability of bankruptcy to discharge
civil liabilities, and the existence of limited but important exceptions to the assets that must be
liquidated in a bankruptcy proceeding, the practical reality of tort litigation in the United States
is that liability insurance is the only asset that plaintiffs can count on collecting.”).
134. Id. at 5–10.
135. See id. at 6 (“For defendants who would not be sued in the absence of liability insurance,
the fact that the insurance policy limit functions as a de facto ‘cap’ on the defendants’ tort liability
is obvious.”).
136. Id.
137. See Meinhard Lukas, The Function of Regulatory Law in the Context of Tort Law –
Conclusions, in TORT AND REGULATORY LAW 449, 453 (Willem H. van Boom et al. eds., 2007)
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Another reason that makes the total control through liability less
viable is that the use of a certain liability rule—prominently negligence
and strict liability—may not always simultaneously calibrate the
desirable level of activity and the desirable level of care at large. In a
unilateral case, strict liability may result in the optimal level of care and
that of activity taken by injurers, since an injurer’s objective is in line
with the social objective.138 In the case of bilateral accidents, strict
liability with a defense of contributory negligence leads to both the
desirable level of care and level of activity on the injurer side.139 Yet on
the victim side, strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence
may lead victims to engage excessively in their activities, as they do not
bear the losses when due care has been paid.
Hence, in the end, it is hard to tell in general which liability rule
would be most effective. Chances are that strict liability will be more
workable if the injurers’ level of activity is more important to control;
otherwise, the negligence standard will do. In a similar vein, liability
under the negligence rule, based on which the injurer is held liable
because he fails to take proper precautions, can cause the level of
activity to be excessive on the injurer’s side.140 Taken together, neither
of the liability rules can reach the optimal level of care and activity on
both sides.
3. The Failure of Self-Regulation
Self-regulation has gone beyond its literal meaning as the private
ordering independent of government regulation; instead, it is taken as
a delegation of rule-making power in a legal context.141 Self-regulation
may outperform governmental regulation in terms of expertise or

(discussing how tort law only specifies general standards of conduct leading to “differences in
evaluation”).
138. Shavell, supra note 114, at 146.
139. Id. at 147.
140. Id. at 146–47.
141. ANTHONY OGUS, Self-regulation, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 589–
90 (Alain Marciano & Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 2000). There are U.S. laws and regulations
incorporating the LEED standards, inter alia those at the local level. See e.g., Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 24, Part 11 (2016), chapters 4–8; Wash. Rev. Code § 39.35D.080 (2005). But some of the GB
regulations do not expressly refer to a certain version of the LEED system or to any specific
requirements. See id. The vagueness as such may not accord with the intelligible principle of the
non-delegation doctrine, as the rules of a rating system could be changed at the whim of industry
rule-makers without due process or government approval. Edward Teyber, Incorporating Third
Party Green Building Rating Systems into Municipal Building and Zoning Codes, 31 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 832, 843–44 (2014).
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information, flexibility, cost effectiveness,142 and speeding up
innovation with less red tape;143 meanwhile, it may score better than no
regulation when the market fails and cooperation among parties is hard
to achieve.144 However, not all the forms of self-regulation avail those
benefits unconditionally.145
First of all, better information does not ensure better information
processing in any case. It is possible that private parties have better
expertise than the government. But not all parties will necessarily act
upon what they know, nor will the information always be evenly
distributed among private parties. Those problems may as well happen
in the case of self-regulation on GB compliance. There are different
certifications and standards for GB compliance, which may differ in
their requirements on GB performances. Without a minimum bar on
what qualifies as a GB, the GB stakeholders are likely to choose a
certification system with laxer standards so as to easily “greenwash”
their projects.146 In light of such manipulation, the GB certification may
appear less reliable over time.
Second, self-regulation may involve private interest concerns and
may not induce competition in a positive way. There are different
interest groups that act as self-regulators. Some of them take shape in
response to a public problem, as with environmental NGOs. On some
occasions, self-regulation consists overwhelmingly of the industry or
professionals, who are able to gather as strong lobbies. These lobbies
may use its delegated power to reduce competition in the interest of

142. OGUS, supra note 141, at 591.
143. See generally Christodoulos Stefanadis, Self-regulation, Innovation, and the Financial
Industry, 23 J. REG. ECON. 5, 5–25 (2003).
144. See James C. Miller, The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of
Self-regulation, 4 CATO J. 897–903 (1985).
145. Industries may comply with environmental standards on a voluntary basis under threat
of future more stringent regulation. See John W. Maxwell et al., Self-regulation and Social Welfare:
The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 583 (2000). There
are other conditions in which self-regulation may work. An empirical study has shown that, in
pursuit of social welfare, “self-regulation is more likely to yield higher social welfare when
uncertainty is higher, when the divergence of interests between producers and consumers is less,
or when the government is more populist. In contrast, when uncertainty is low, when the society
is polarized on the regulatory issue, or when the producer lobby is strong, social welfare is higher
under [regulation] than under [self-regulation].” Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, Allocating
Lawmaking Powers: Self-regulation vs. Government Regulation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 520, 529
(2007).
146. As the most commonly used GB rating system, the LEED has been accused of
manipulating and availing easy points in GB certification. In U.S Building Industry, Is it Too Easy
to be Green?, USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/
10/24/green-building-leed-certification/1650517/.
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their members, rather than pursuing goals in the public interest.147
When governments incorporate industry-based standards into
mandates, it is likely that rent-seeking can create perverse incentives
through regulation.148 Once lobbying succeeds, those vested-interest
holders are able to create entry barriers on newcomers who may offer
more efficient standards.149 As a result, standards might turn out to be
too low to meet the desirable quality; alternatively, they may be so high
to go beyond the needs of solving market failures,150 as there is little
outside supervision to attest the proportionality.
Lastly, self-regulation may be abused due to less transparency and
accountability. Self-regulation is collective and regulatory in character,
whereby it may empower professional associations to control both
entry or licensing and performance in some cases.151 This is slightly
different from the case in which governments give licenses for entries,
while self-regulatory agencies set or enforce specific standards on
performance.152 But this is not the case for self-regulation in a full sense.
Self-regulation can at times be a closed system that “should be subject
to external supervision and control in an effort to ensure that . . . power
is not abused,”153 where rules and their enforcement are shaped
147. OGUS, supra note 141, at 591–92.
148. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 108 (1994).
149. OGUS, supra note 141, at 591. A case in point could be the LEED referring to the FSC
wood products. In an old version of the LEED system, the USGBC required that the wood used
in a LEED project should be certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which has given
rise to a battle between the FSC and another wood certification run by the Sustainable Forestry
Initiative (SFI) program. The LEED’s exclusive use of the FSC rating system has been accused
of violating antitrust laws when adopted by municipal governments. See Stephen Del Percio,
Revisiting Allied Tube and Noerr: The Antitrust Implications of Green Building Legislation and
Case Law Considerations for Policymakers, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 241
(2009). The USGBC itself has tried to fix the problem. As of 2016, the USGBC seems to open the
door to wood certification programs other than the FSC. The USGBC introduced the Alternative
Compliance Path (ACP) pilot to close a loophole in the current raw materials credit that required
only a certain percentage of wood be FSC-certified. The ACP pilot would require that 100 percent
of the wood in a project is verified by a legal source, as defined by ASTM D7612-10. See Press
Release, Marissa Long, USGBC, USGBC Announces New LEED Pilot ACP Designed to Help
Eliminate Irresponsibly Sourced Materials—Like Illegal Wood—From the Building Material
Supply Chain (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.usgbc.org/articles/usgbc-announces-new-leed-pilot-acpdesigned-help-eliminate-irresponsibly-sourced-materials%E2%80%94.
150. See generally Roger Van den Bergh, Self-regulation of the Medical and Legal Professions:
Remaining Barriers to Competition and EC-Law, in ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND SELFREGULATION – AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 113 (Bernardo Bortolotti & Gianluca Fiorentini eds.,
1999).
151. Thomas G. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93, 95 (1961).
152. Id. at 97–98.
153. Alan C. Page, Self-regulation: The Constitutional Dimension, 49 MOD. L. REV. 141, 142
(1986).
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through a less formal procedure, involving less statutory scrutiny and
public participation.
Without government or statutory supervision, self-regulation also
lacks accountability. This can mean that, on the one side, there are
weak constraints to prevent professional associations from preying on
the market and on the other side, no one other than the self-regulators
will be responsible for the consequences. Such a scenario is unlike coregulation, where the government is liable for the involvement of selfregulation.154
D. Conclusions
The conclusions from these theoretical observations may be
relatively straightforward: GB is in society’s interest as it promotes
sustainability; however, without an adequate legal framework GB will
not flourish. The primary function of legal instruments is to provide an
institutional framework to lead the stakeholders toward adopting GB.
Moreover, given the important expressive value of law, legal rules can
equally shape perceptions of stakeholders on the importance of GB.
It is important to consider which instruments from the classic
environmental governance toolbox may be most appropriate to
promote GB. A variety of traditional command-and-control
instruments may serve this goal, but there are limited possibilities for
the government to issue efficient command-and-control regulation
aiming at the promotion of GB. Market-based instruments could
provide efficient incentives to stakeholders, but the limits of some
instruments, such as liability rules, reduce the importance of their role.
Some suasive instruments, like information disclosure and voluntary
agreements, may play a supplementary role, but to the extent that the
suasive instruments are part of a self-regulatory framework, they
involve the traditional limits of self-regulation in controlling
environmental externalities. This article therefore argues that, given
the fact that all instruments taken individually have specific
shortcomings, a combination of instruments—referred to as a smart
mix—may be the proper way to promote green building.
Against this theoretical backdrop, this article now examines which
instruments are used in practice to promote GB in the United States.

154. Id. at 166.
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IV. INSTRUMENTS AT WORK FOR GB COMPLIANCE: THE U.S. CASE
U.S. law often uses many of the instruments discussed in Part III.
Most of those can be found in state legislation, although there are
examples in federal law as well. Following the discussion in Part III B,
this article first provides examples of command-and-control regulation
aiming at green building, mostly building permits and land use planning
(A). Next, this article shows how, within market-based instruments,
financing plays an important role in promoting GB (B). The most
important suasive instrument used has been mandatory information
disclosure (C). The article focuses specifically on one instrument that
recently has gained popularity, the Supplemental Environmental
Project, as an example of an instrument mix for GB (D). Section E
concludes.
A. Command-and-Control Instruments: Building Permits and Land
Use Planning
A possible way to mandate GB compliance is to make it a
requirement in building permits, which has been adopted in cities like
Chicago155 and Seattle.156 Usually, a building permit is ex ante in
character, so it may be difficult to ensure a life-cycle compliance. On
that account, the City of Pleasanton, California has come up with a Life
Cycle Analysis permit, in which case the regulatory process does not
end after issuance.157
However, when the government makes an industry-based
certification a requirement in the issuance of a permit, timing concerns
arise. Some of the GB laws at the state or local level require developers
to get an industry-based certification, which may sometimes call for
final documents that are not available until after construction. For
instance, under LEED v. 3.0, building stakeholders must report energy
and water-usage data for one year after a building is issued a permit of
155. See
CITY
OF
CHI.,
Green
Permit,
DEP’T
OF
BLDGS.,
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/bldgs/supp_info/overview_of_the_greenpermitprogr
am.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
156. See SEATTLE DEP’T OF CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS, Priority Green Expedited, GREEN
BUILDINGS PERMIT INCENTIVES http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/permits/greenbuildingincentives/
prioritygreenexpedited/default.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
157. According to the city’s GB ordinance, it needs to go through four steps for a building
permit to be issued. First, the applicant submits application materials and completes “prepermitting review” in company with a review process for building design; second, a GB official
will review the construction prior to issuance of an occupancy permit; third, the GB official then
re-inspects the premises after one year; lastly, the GB official re-inspects again after five years, to
insure that the building remains in compliance. PLEASANTON, CAL., MUN. CODE §
17.50.070(D)(1–3) (2006).
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occupancy.158 If this reporting requirement is not met, certification can
be revoked.159 The de-certification may lead building professionals to
be liable for a failure to achieve the certification, and it is likely that
the statutes of limitations would often expire five years after the
building is issued a certificate of occupancy.160
Increasingly, land use planning is used to promote GBs in pursuit
of public health and environmental protection.161 At the federal level,
E.O. 13514, followed by E.O. 13693, has put forward land planning to
build up a more efficient transportation network, in conjunction with
an environmental impact assessment.162 Elsewhere, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency has used GB compliance as a means
to redevelop brownfields,163 since GB practices can “revive these sites

158. See USGBC, LEED 2009 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR RENOVATIONS 43–44
(2008), http://www.usgbc.org/Docs/Archive/General/Docs5546.pdf.
159. Id.
160. The statute of limitations for common law claims are governed by state statutes and may
vary from state to state. See Jeanne Schubert Barnum & Levi Jones, Green Building: Limitations
Clock
Starts
at
First
Sign
of
Trouble,
A.B.A.
(Sept.
10,
2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/construction/email/summer2012/summer20120912-green-building-limitations-clock.html (documenting a green building related construction
case where the state statute of limitations was dispositive).
161. For instance, with regard to land use planning, the model proposed by the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act required that state and local land use regulations should be “designed to
lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote
health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to avoid the overcrowding of
land; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and
other public requirements.” See A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (SZEA) § 3 (U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE) (1926), http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/StndZoningEnablingAct1926.pdf.
162. See Exec. Order No. 13693, Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade, 80
Fed. Reg. 15871 (Mar. 19, 2015). See also Exec. Order No. 13514, Federal Leadership in
Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009) (revoked
by Exec. Order 13693, 80 Fed. Reg. 15871 (Mar. 19, 2015)).
163. GBs such as the Brownfields Pilot Projects included: the Springfield in Massachusetts;
the National Aquarium in Baltimore’s Center for Aquatic Life and Conservation in Baltimore,
Maryland; ReGenesis District Redevelopment in Toledo, Ohio; World Headquarters for Heifer
International in Little Rock, Arkansas; the Trailnet, Inc. Trailhead Building in St. Louis,
Missouri; a Community Culture and Commercial Center in Kauai, Hawaii; and the Volcanic
Legacy Discovery Center in Mount Shasta, California. See EPA, GREEN BUILDINGS ON
BROWNFIELDS
INITIATIVE:
PILOT
PROJECTS
FACT
SHEET
1–3
(2002),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/P1000XR8.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EP
A&Index=2000+Thru+2005&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRe
strict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFiel
dOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data%5C00thr
u05%5CTxt%5C00000015%5CP1000XR8.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous
&SortMethod=h%7C-&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/
x150y150g16/i425&Display=hpfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyAction
S&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL.
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and promote growth and development”164 in conjunction with the goals
and requirements of GB.
As it is highly localized, local planning and zoning codes more
frequently require GB compliance. For instance, in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, any new or existing building project of 25,000 square
feet or more is required to meet GB requirements laid down in the
city’s Zoning Ordinance.165 The Zoning Code for the Town of Normal,
Illinois also mandates that all new construction should meet the latest
LEED standards.166 Some other cities like Seattle provide expedited
permits for GB compliance in its land use code.167
Nevertheless, in a legal context, GB compliance may not always
be in accord with the existing land use rules. At first blush affordable
GB housing sounds like a contradiction in terms, given the higher first
cost. The government may require green renovations in a community
through land use planning and zoning. Though GB planning may bring
environmental benefits to the society at large, it not be affordable to all
individuals. In other words, GB planning should take income levels into
account. If GB compliance becomes mandatory in those areas, residents who
cannot afford to build green may lose places to live. On that account, some
state or local governments couple green zoning with ex ante subsidies
to help municipalities reach their affordable housing targets.168
The second concern around GB compliance involves the
preservation of historic and cultural sites. Installations of equipment
for energy efficiency, like solar panels or renovations of a HVAC
system, may foul a landscape of historic value. The GB law in Illinois
deals with this issue by giving exemptions when GB compliance would
compromise the historic nature of the structure.169

164. Amy L. Edwards, When Brown Meets Green: Integrating Sustainable Development
Principles into Brownfield Redevelopment, 18 WIDENER L.J. 861, 870 (2009).
165. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ZONING ORDINANCE § 22.000 (2011).
166. NORMAL, ILL., CODE § 15.17-14 (1969), Amended 5/18/09 by Ord. No. 5258.
167. See SEATTLE DEP’T OF CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS, supra note 156.
168. Michael A. Wolf, A Yellow Light for “Green Zoning”: Some Words of Caution About
Incorporating Green Building Standards into Local Land Use Law, 43 URBAN L. 949, 961–62
(2011). As an aside, not only the government but also the USGBC has been aware of this concern.
In 2009, the USGBC came up with LEED Neighborhood Development rating system, in which 7
points can be awarded for dwelling units priced for households around or below the average
income. See USGBC ET AL., LEED 2009 FOR NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT RATING SYSTEM
57–59
(2011),
http://www.growsmartri.org/training/LEED%20for%20Neighborhood%20
Development%20Rating%20System%20v2009%20(Updat.pdf.
169. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3130/15(e)(4) (LexisNexis 2018).

17. Shen & Faure_ME Final Proof (Do Not Delete)

1/1/2019 6:16 PM

80

[Vol. XXIX:49

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

Lastly, land use regulations often travel with taking claims, which
may also plague GB compliance and restrict the use of land. Against
the U.S. common law backdrop, GB compliance regarding land use
may face less taking claims than other land regulations do.170 Under
U.S. law, regulatory restrictions on land use may count as takings if and
only if they reduce the economic value or the utility of properties
without a due process and just compensation.171 GB requirements,
unlike other zoning laws, would not completely deny the utility of land,
and where possible, may even encourage property owners to make the
best use of land, as is the case with brownfields redevelopment. Also,
it might be hard for property owners to prove that GB compliance
leads to a much lower economic value of the property;172 at some point
GB compliance may even yield financial benefits, like higher premiums
for landlords or a lower operation cost for end-users.173
In all, it appears that formal regulation often requires compliance
with industry codes like the LEED standards. In other cases
certification by a private certifier is required. Those are examples of
so-called hybrid or co-regulation where the government relies on
private standards or certification.
B. Market-based Instruments
1. Tax Reductions
There are many examples of taxation systems at the federal level
and in state legislation where taxes for green properties are reduced,
rather than imposing higher taxes on non-green properties. At the
federal level, tax credits are given to enhance energy-related GB
performance: for instance, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided the

170. Keith Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green Building Laws and
the Transformation of the Built Environment, 39 ENVTL. L. 507, 552–53 (2012).
171. The U.S. Constitution provides that private property “shall not be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The identification of a taking was summed
up in Agins v. City of Tiburon, which states that the application of land-use regulations to a
particular piece of property is a taking only “if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests.” Yet later in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court ruled out the
Agins test as a way to tell whether or not a regulatory activity is a taking. To file a taking suit, the
plaintiff must assert either a physical taking, i.e., a total deprivation/occupation regulation, or a
land-use exaction that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial uses of their
properties. See Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
172. Hirokawa, supra note 170, at 554–55.
173. Eichholtz, supra note 32, at 60–61.
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owners of commercial or residential buildings with benefits to improve
HVAC systems or related insulation.174 At the state and local level,
governments relieve taxes for LEED-certified buildings.175 Those tax
credits are provided for commercial and residential buildings, and in a
few cases they are used to award the recovery or the redevelopment of
a historic site.176
Instead of creating a new tax, tax reductions enable the
government to worry less about constitutionality, but tax reductions
may cause unmanageable reductions in revenues. Among other
jurisdictions, New York State has come up with some ways to prevent
excessive losses. On the one hand, the authority to reduce tax is limited
to localities of a particular size; for instance, tax reductions can be given
to green roofs in cities of one million or more by $ 4.5 per square foot.177
In another case, a property tax exemption is available in a city with a
population of not less than 130,000 and not more than 160,000 for
LEED-certified buildings.178 On the other hand, the tax reductions
would not be available indefinitely but instead phase out gradually
over a period of seven to ten years.179
Apart from tax credits, tax increment financing (TIF) has been
used to back green infrastructure development and brownfield
redevelopment.180 Through the use of TIF, municipalities divert future
property tax revenue increases from a defined area to a public
improvement project in the community. By 2004, 49 U.S. states and the

174. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1331, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 179D).
175. For example, Arizona offers tax relief to LEED-certified datacenters that move into
substantially vacant buildings; Maryland has extended the Sustainable Communities Tax Credit
Program that favors high performance buildings that meet or exceed LEED gold certification,
and provide for a tax credit for the rehabilitation of small commercial properties under specified
circumstances; Louisiana provides a tax credit for certain solar energy systems; Washington
requires the commission to establish eligibility standards considering cost, condition, energy
efficiency of available housing to qualify for tax exemption for residential buildings. See generally
USGBC, BETTER BUILDINGS, BETTER POLICY (2014), http://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/
files/STATE_WINS_REPORT_2014-3.pdf.
176. For instance, New Hampshire allows towns and cities to add historic structures in the
municipality, preservation and reuse of which would conserve the embodied energy of existing
building stock, to the community revitalization tax relief program. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
79-E:2 (LexisNexis 2018).
177. See 1 RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK §105-01, ch. 100.
178. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 485-o (LexisNexis 2018).
179. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 470 (LexisNexis 2018).
180. Olaf Merk, et al., Financing Green Urban Infrastructure 36 (OECD Reg’l Dev., Working
Papers 2012/10, 2011), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-policy/WP_Financing_Green_Urban_Infrastructure.pdf.
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District of Columbia have authorized the use of TIF in legislation or
regulations.181
In response to state legislation, local governments also set out
regulations of the TIF. Some of those regulations make GB standards
the criteria to evaluate projects requesting TIF.182
In recent years, TIF has been misused for urban sprawl instead of
for green projects promotion.183 The designation of a TIF requires that
an area be blighted and that the development be contingent on the
incentive.184 The two requirements, however, have nothing to say about
the specific conditions on which the TIF can be applied. Given this
vagueness, some states may relax the two requirements,185 which could
“become merely a gesture of formality to justify that TIFs are not
simply giveaways to developments that would have occurred
anyway.”186 As a result, the TIFs for green projects may not accomplish
their goal but rather turn farmland into commercial districts that
contribute revenues to localities.187 TIFs also make it possible for
governments to condemn homes for a private development project,
which may lead to taking actions within a TIF district.188 Given those
concerns, TIFs have been phased out in some areas.189

181. See generally COUNCIL OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AGENCIES (CDFA), TIF STATEREPORT
(2008),
https://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/0/
8ee94afeece08bc988257936006747c5/$FILE/CDFA-2008-TIF-State-By-State-Report.pdf.
182. CITY OF COLUMBIA, MO., TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 3, https://www.como.gov/wp-content/uploads/TIF_FAQ.pdf.
183. Greg LeRoy, TIF Greenfields, and Sprawl: How an Incentive Created to Alleviate Slums
Has Come to Subsidize Upscale Mall and New Urbanist Developments, 60 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3,
6 (2008).
184. Id. at 4.
185. Joan Youngman, TIF at a Turning Point: Defining Debt Down 3 (Lincoln Inst. of Land
Policy, Working Paper No. WP11JY1, 2011), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/
pubfiles/1914-1232-tif-final.pdf.
186. Merk et al., supra note 180, at 38.
187. LeRoy, supra note 183, at 10.
188. In Kelo v. City of New London, for instance, The Supreme Court of the United States
ruled that the general benefits a community enjoyed from economic growth qualified private
redevelopment plans as a permissible “public use” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
189. For instance, California passed legislation to put off nearly 400 redevelopment agencies
that implemented TIFs in California and set out measures to stabilize school funding by reducing
the diversion of property taxes from the public sector including school districts. Assemb. B. X126,
2011 Cal. State Assemb. (Cal. 2011).
BY-STATE
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2. Public Procurements
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)
allows the U.S. government to promote GBs via its purchasing
power,190 in ways that encourage governments at all levels to buy GB
products for their own use. For instance, EO 13693 requires renewable
energy use in agency buildings191 and mandates that federal agencies
buy green products. Likewise, state and local governments also put in
place GB compliance through executive orders or programs authorized
by federal law. The New York Governor signed EO No. 111, ordering
that all new buildings owned or occupied by state agencies shall be built
in light of the guidelines on GB compliance to the maximum extent
practicable.192
Affordable housing programs, which work on the demand side of
the housing market, appear to be another way to make GBs cheaper to
residents. The ARRA makes $5 billion available for the
Weatherization Assistance Program to make energy-efficient homes
affordable for low-income home owners.193 Authorized by federal law,
some state governments have made GB performance a part of their
affordable housing plans. The California legislature declared solar
energy systems for low-income residential housing a goal, leading to
the creation of the Single- Family Affordable Solar Homes Program.194
The Washington government has put the LEED into its affordable
housing scheme, in which case “the Department of Community, Trade,
and Economic development shall identify, implement, and apply a
sustainable building program for affordable housing projects that
receive housing trust fund . . . funding in a state capital budget.”195
Though widely used, public procurements are meant to jump-start
GB compliance by financing it, making private stakeholders aware of
GB compliance.196 Public procurement can be widely used when the
190. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 14002–04, 123
Stat. 115, 279–82 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 10002).
191. Exec. Order No. 13693, supra note 162, at Sec. 3(d)(i).
192. Exec. Order No. 111 Directing State Agencies to be More Energy Efficient and
Environmentally Aware “Green and Clean State Buildings and Vehicles”, § II(B) (N.Y. 2001).
193. ARRA, supra note 190, tit. IV.
194. GRID ALTERNATIVES, SINGLE-FAMILY AFFORDABLE SOLAR HOMES (SASH)
PROGRAM:
SEMI-ANNUAL
PROGRAM
STATUS
REPORT,
(Jan.
2017),
http://gridalternatives.org/sites/default/files/Semi%20Annual%20SASH%20Program%20Status
%20Report_January%202017.pdf.
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.35D.080 (2018), http://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=
39.35D.080.
196. See generally Timothy Simcoe & Michael W. Toffel, Government Green Procurement
Spillovers: Evidence from Municipal Building Policies in California, 68 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
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uptake of GBs is low, and when there are few private parties or selfregulators devoted to GB. A further point to note is that public
procurement should not be overly engaged in residential or
commercial GB projects, lest it crowd out private investments.
3. The PACE Loans
As a way to finance GB projects, federal law authorizes state and
local governments to work with lenders to provide green builders with
loans at a lower interest rate.197 Among other programs, Property
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) loans, which were launched by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (USHUD),
have been widely used to finance energy efficiency, renewable energy,
and water conservation upgrades to buildings.198 A PACE loan fully
covers a project’s costs and is repaid for up to 20 years with an
assessment added to the property’s tax bill. A PACE loan stays with
the property upon sale and may be shared with tenants.199
A PACE loan provides two advantages to governments and
property owners. First, a PACE loan is a debt tied to a property and
not to a property owner. The property owner repays the debt in the
form of future property taxes and will not be responsible for the
improvements when he or she wants to sell the property.200 To put in
place the PACE program, states need to empower municipalities to
create a PACE program through legislation.201 The PACE financing
authority also must include an “opt-in” feature through which property
owners agree in writing to receive financing and have assessments
made against their property, which appears to be slightly different from
a traditional tax assessment.202
411–34 (2014).
197. For instance, in support of energy efficiency improvements for homes, the California
Housing Finance Agency is authorized to make grants to buyers of residential structures
combined with first mortgage loans in association with the Federal Housing Administration’s
(FHA) Energy Efficient Mortgage Program. See Cal-EEM + Grant Program, CALIFORNIA
HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, http://www.calhfa.ca.gov/homebuyer/programs/eem.htm (last
visited Mar. 2017).
198. What is PACE, PACENATION, http://pacenation.us/what-is-pace/ (last visited Mar.
2017).
199. Id.
200. PACE for Homeowners, PACENATION, http://pacenation.us/pace-for-homeowners/
(last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
201. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216C.436(2)(11) (2010). For more information about state PACE
laws see PACENATION, http://pacenation.us/pace-programs/ (last visited Mar. 2017).
202. Annie Carmichael, Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Enabling Legislation, THE
VOTE SOLAR INITIATIVE (Mar. 18 2010), http://www.pacenation.us/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/PACE_enablinglegislation-3.18.10.pdf.
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Second, a PACE loan may showcase better financing terms
derived from the priority given to tax liens when default occurs.203 In
principle, property tax assessments are superior to mortgage loans or
other liens on a property, regardless of the date the first or secondary
liens are recorded.204 In that case, local governments and investors in
PACE loans can get the balance owed on a PACE assessment before
any recovery by a mortgage lender.205 This may make investors feel
more secure about the property owners’ ability to repay. Perhaps for
that reason, PACE financing may present lower transaction costs and
reach a larger group of homeowners.206
In July 2010, the U.S. secondary mortgage market regulator, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), issued a statement that
mortgages originating in a jurisdiction with a PACE program would be
subject to significant restrictions.207 Those restrictions led state and
local governments, together with environmental interest groups who
supported the PACE financing, to fight back through lawsuits, seeking
injunctions or declarations against the underwriting restrictions.208
Governments and environmental groups tend to assert that PACE
financing is not a loan, analogizing the financing to other tax
assessment used by local governments to pursue public interest.209
However, the argument may not hold since the PACE financing by its

203. Prentiss Cox, Keeping PACE?: The Case Against Property Assessed Clean Energy
Financing Programs, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 84, 94–95 (2011).
204. In foreclosure, liens on a real estate are put in order, in which case prior liens are paid
before liens recorded later in time. The prior liens are usually first mortgage liens, and the later
liens are the secondary mortgage liens. Yet tax assessments are not subject to the lien priority
rule. In principle, unpaid property tax assessments have priority over other liens, regardless of the
date the prior liens were recorded or when the tax assessments became delinquent. I.R.C. §
6323(b) (1986).
205. Cox, supra note 203, at 95.
206. THE WHITE HOUSE, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS 4–6
(Oct. 18, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/PACE_Principles.pdf.
207. Press Release, Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy
Retrofit Loan Programs (July 6, 2010), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFAStatement-on-Certain-Energy-Retrofit-Loan-Programs.aspx [hereinafter FHFA Statement].
208. The governments and environmental groups as plaintiffs asserted that there was no
rational relationship between the action taken by the regulators and their statutory authority
regarding safety and soundness of the lending institutions. In that sense, the regulators’ actions
were in violation of Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See, e.g., Cty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous.
Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
815 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); California ex rel. Brown v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 10cv-03084 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137619 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
209. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. CV 10 3317 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010);
Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 10-cv-03084 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137619
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010).
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nature is indistinguishable from a loan, despite that it may work for the
public interest.210
Apart from litigation, PACE proponents also lobbied for the
passage of a bill introduced in Congress known as the PACE
Assessment Protection Act, hoping to resolve the conflict between
PACE programs and the underwriting restrictions.211 But the Bill did
not get passed in the end. As neither of the efforts worked out, many
state and local governments have diverted the PACE financing from
residential energy improvements to energy investments by commercial
entities,212 and homeowners quit the PACE programs because of
higher interest rates and higher transaction costs.213 On the other hand,
some PACE districts did report that the pilot PACE programs
increased homeowners’ willingness to pay for energy efficiency
improvements.214 This change may be attributable to local
governments’ efforts to make the PACE financing smaller in scale and
work jointly with other sanctions and incentive programs rather than
PACE financing in its original form.215
4. Liability
In terms of negative externalities, rules of product liability and
liability for land contamination may promote GB compliance.216

210. See Cox, supra note 203, at 104. Cox further explains why PACE financing should be
taken as a loan. Unlike a for-public tax assessment, homeowners assume PACE on a voluntary
basis, and the money flowing from PACE loans will be given to homeowners for energy efficiency
improvements. For lenders, PACE financing leads to another lien on the property to evaluate the
value of the home as security in case of default by the homeowner on the mortgage loan.
211. The bill was introduced for the first time in 2010, but it was not enacted by the 111th
Congress. PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 5766, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill was
brought before Congress once more on March 24, 2014, but again failed to pass. PACE
Assessment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4285, 113th Cong. (2014).
212. CLINTON CLIMATE INITIATIVE ET AL., PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE)
FINANCING:
UPDATE
ON
COMMERCIAL
PROGRAMS
2–4
(2011),
http://etapublications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/policy-brief-pace-financing.pdf.
213. ANDREW BRAAKSMA ET AL., REPORT ON A PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY
(PACE) PROGRAM FOR THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS 36–38 (2010).
214. See, e.g., Memorandum from Eric Angstadt, Director, Planning and Development, City
of Berkeley Office of the City Manager, to the Honorable Mayor and Members of the City
Council, City of Berkeley (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.cityofberkeley.info/ Clerk/City_Council/
2015/04_Apr/Documents/2015-04-07_Item_13_Property_Assessed_Clean.aspx.
215. See Cox, supra note 203, at 120–21.
216. When GB compliance becomes a part of a building project, it is likely that building
professionals or other building stakeholders, like lenders, will bear more obligations or face a
higher standard of care in the building contract. Yet it might be difficult for lawmakers to
generalize ex ante what qualifies as the optimal rules in a contract. What the law can do instead is
set up a bottom line to explain what bargaining behaviors are legal, meanwhile ensuring parties’
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Interestingly, some buildings or structures, including mobile homes
and tract housing, have been considered products, which implies
liability for defects in design and construction.217 Hence, it is more
feasible to sue companies whose building products expose users to
hazardous substances, such as radon and asbestos, and cause harm.218
Liability for land reclamation can be derived from CERCLA,219
RCRA220 and TSCA.221 It is very likely that building stakeholders
would be held liable for land contamination when they excavate soil or
are found in actual management of hazardous substances disposal,
according to CERCLA.222 Interpretation of CERCLA indicates that
two types of liability would be assumed if and only if harm occurs. This
corresponds to the theoretical point that tort liability works better in
dealing with negative externalities.223

free will to bargain over specific terms. Where GB standards are not mandatory, contracting
parties can keep the standard of care in situ and exclude GB compliance, as is the case with GB
contracts in which liability for a failure to achieve certification can be waived or limited.
Therefore, we would like to look at tort liability, wherein lawmakers have more to say in providing
incentives to build green. See Prum, supra note 48, at 417; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The
Common Law of Contract and The Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2016); AM. INST.
OF ARCHITECTS, supra note 128.
217. Grace C. Guiffrida, The Proposed Indoor Air Quality Acts of 1993: The Comprehensive
Solution to a Far-reaching Problem, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 345–47 (1993); see also Blagg
v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981).
218. See Gene J. Heady, Stuck Inside These Four Walls: Recognition of Sick Building
Syndrome Has Laid the Foundation to Raise Toxic Tort Litigation to New Heights, 26 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1041, 1049–51 (1995) (summarizing Rogers v. Keller-Martin Org., which assigned liability
for inadequate construction standards in an elementary school).
219. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
220. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012).
221. Toxics Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012).
222. Under CERCLA, the EPA can require liable parties to conduct cleanups or “the EPA
can conduct a cleanup and subsequently seek cleanup costs from liable parties. CERCLA §
9607(a) defines a liable party as: (1) the current owner and operator of a contaminated property;
(2) any owner or operator at the time of disposal of any hazardous substances; (3) any person who
arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances, or arranged for the transportation
of hazardous substances for disposal or treatment; and (4) any person who accepts hazardous
substances for transport to the property and selects the disposal site.” CERCLA further clarifies
that a person is an “owner or operator” of a facility (or property) if that person: “(1) owns or
operates the facility; or (2) owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at that facility
immediately before title to the facility, or control of the facility, was conveyed to a state or local
government due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment or similar means.”
CERCLA § 9601(20)(A).
223. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 45 (explaining how harmful externalities are
prevented through use of liability rules).
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In dealing with negative externalities, liability may at times undercompensate or under-deter, particularly when it comes to
environmental harm. U.S. GB law has its ways to deal with those
problems. In the interest of deterrence, U.S. law has a strict liability
regime for product liability and makes punitive damages available to
the injured, in addition to the actual loss. For instance, in the Austin
case, the plaintiffs sought punitive damages, along with damages for
medical expenses, attorney’s fees and other costs, to compensate for
the harm caused by a hazardous exposure to buildings at an elementary
school.224 But the causation can sometimes be hard to prove, especially
when a victim is less willing to sue given the high legal cost and low
probability of success. Forum-shopping may make it more likely for the
victim to win a case.
Problems may still arise when the injurer is not able to pay the
damages. On that account, the law has tried to make parties other than
the actual injurers pay for the damages, including lenders with deeppockets who support building projects. The CERCLA of 1980,225 along
with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA)226 and the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act (Brownfields Act) in 2002,227 impose strict liability
on owners and operators to jointly and severally bear the costs of
cleanups. Lenders would be liable for recoveries should they be able to
influence the borrower’s hazardous waste disposal.228
224. In Texas, a group of 86 plaintiffs at an elementary school, including 44 children and 42
adults, had been exposed to poor IAQ with hazardous substances, and suffered from sick building
syndrome (SBS), e.g. headaches, nausea, dizziness, throat and eye irritation, and allergic
reactions. In 1990, the plaintiffs filed a suit against 29 defendants, including materials
manufacturers, material suppliers, mechanical engineers, architects and contractors, who were
supposed to compensate for the harm due to the violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The plaintiffs also sought relief under separate
liability rules against different subgroups of the defendants. Referencing the strict liability rule,
the plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturers produced products with hazardous chemicals and
failed to test and take precautions against the danger lying in the products. Under the negligence
rule against building contractors and architects, the plaintiffs alleged that at the planning and
construction stages, the defendants breached express and implied warranties that the school
would be a safe and non-toxic place to be, and attempted to mislead the plaintiffs about the
hazardous exposure. The case was settled with an amount covering punitive damages, tuition and
transportation expenses resulting from re-schooling, past and future medical expenses and
attorneys’ fees. See Heady, supra note 218, at 1049–51.
225. §§ 9601–9675.
226. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
227. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (Brownfields Act),
Pub. L. No. 107–118 (2002).
228. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1990).
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By the same token, U.S. case law has broadened lender liability,
putting lenders who take title at a foreclosure sale in the same position
as any other buyer.229 However, lenders may be deterred by the lender
liability in its initial form.230 Correspondingly, the law has availed a
security interest exemption for lenders, whereby a lender is not liable
if the lender only maintains a mortgage or lien on a property. Liability
does attach when a lender gets involved in the actual management of
the property.231 Despite the exemption, lender liability might help in
paying for damages and at some point put bad actors out of business.232
Of course, these are issues which to some extent go beyond the role of
liability law in promoting green building.
C. Suasive Instruments
Information disclosure is a part of U.S. law that advances or
oversees GB compliance, particularly with regard to energy use.
Information disclosure may “nudge” compliance and cost less than
other instruments.233 The law should clarify what kind of information
should be disclosed, by whom, and how. All else being equal, buildings
of the same type may have different levels of energy use intensity, so
the manner of use may matter more than the energy systems
themselves.234 As such, lawmakers can think to change energy use
behaviors via information, rather than merely financing the adoption
229. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
230. See Prum, supra note 48, at 433–34.
231. CERCLA created a security interest exemption that allows lenders to be immune from
the owner/operator liability therein, provided that the lenders’ activities are meant to protect their
security interest in that facility and they do not participate in the management of the facility on a
daily basis. “Participation in management” does not include activities such as inspecting property,
requiring a response action to be taken to address contamination, providing financial advice, or
renegotiating or restructuring the terms of the security interest. Of note, foreclosing on a property
does not result in liability for a bank, provided the bank takes reasonable steps to convey the
property “at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time, on commercially reasonable
terms.” CERCLA § 9601(20)(F)–(G).
232. The lender liability may, however, affect the level of activity in some ways. It has been
shown that a full lender liability does not necessarily score better than a no-lender-liability rule
in terms of reducing accidents. Too broad lender liability may lead to more accidents. The reason
behind this could be the moral hazard noted in the theory. Because lender liability is joint and
several, the actual injurers might not be fully incentivized to enhance the level of care if they know
that the damages will be borne by others. Besides, an increase in liability will raise the cost of
credit and drive some marginal firms out of business. Hence, it is the lawmakers’ job to consider
the tradeoff between compensating for harm and having more accidents. Pitchford, supra note
127, at 1182–83.
233. OGUS, supra note 148, at 125.
234. See David Hsu, How Much Information Disclosure of Building Energy Performance is
Necessary?, 64 ENERGY POL’Y 263–72, 271 (2014).
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of GB technologies.235 Information disclosure may differ in its impacts
when done by different stakeholders. Sometimes the law may require
the government to provide information. For instance, the EPA has
built up an Energy Star Portfolio and a consensus-based industry
Green Button data access system, which gathers and assesses building
performance on energy use.236 Also, the EPA created the Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI) to make parties better aware of hazardous
wastes.237
The law often requires private stakeholders to disclose
information, either on a voluntary or a mandatory basis. E.O. 13415
encouraged vendors and contractors to register with a registry or
organization to report their GHG emissions.238 Under CERCLA, a
failure to report the release of hazardous substances may result in fines
or imprisonment.239 As an example at the state level, the New York
State Green Building Construction Act requires parties to report
annually to the Office of General Services the information about
energy consumption, water and waste reduction, IAQ, and
maintenance processes.240
The means of disclosure is another important consideration.
Generally, information disclosure can be done in two ways: product
labeling and reporting.241 Product labeling programs are often used for
GB compliance in the United States, prominently for the LEED
system and the ENERGY STAR program, and there is evidence
showing significant premiums benefiting from both certifications.242
Yet those labeling programs in isolation are self-regulatory in
character. As noted before, self-regulation is no stranger to rentseeking and lobbying and may at times be subject to private rather than

235. Id. at 270–71.
236. See Exec. Order No. 13693, § 3(a)(i)(A), 80 Fed. Reg. 34, 149 (June 15, 2015).
237. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TRI FACT SHEET (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2015-10/documents/2015_tri_for_communities_fact_sheet_final.pdf.
238. Exec. Order No. 13514, § 13, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 8, 2009).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2012).
240. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 13-107 (McKinney 2009).
241. Robert N. Stavins, Experience with Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments, in
1 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 355–435 (Karl-Goran Maler & Jeffrey R.
Vicent eds., 2006).
242. See Franz Fuerst & Patrick McAllister, Green Noise or Green Value? Measuring the
Effects of Environmental Certification on Office Values, 39 REAL EST. ECON. 45–69 (2011)
(addressing the impact of green labelling systems on real estate values); see generally Piet
Eichholtz., Nils Kok & John M. Quigley, Doing Well by Doing Good? Green Office Buildings,
100 AM. ECON. REV. 2492 (2010) (describing green building certification schemes, particularly
LEED and Energy Star).
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public interest.243 Such concerns are reflected in the accusations against
the LEED system for certifying “green-wash” projects.244
Reporting so far seems to be less used in GB compliance. There
are two basic ways of reporting, namely benchmarking and auditing. In
the case of GB compliance, the former requires owners or occupiers to
report some basic information on energy use to a government-made
database, usually through energy bills. Energy auditing requires an
assessment by a building professional, such as an engineer licensed by
the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning
Engineers (ASHRAE). Such a professional reports in a more detailed
way about building characteristics, HVAC systems, and occupancy
status.245
The two ways of reporting may differ in their costs246 and impacts
on stakeholders’ energy use behaviors.247 A study has shown that
government-led energy audits can lead industries to commit to energy
efficiency projects.248 But it might not be true to say auditing scores
better than benchmarking in any case. On the one hand, energy
auditing includes more detail about the specific technologies or
property ownerships. 249 The information, however, can sometimes be
proprietary and therefore confidential and protected by law. On the
other hand, the energy auditing may be more costly but less useful.250
In theory, environmental regulation favors more performancebased standards than specification standards.251 At first blush,
benchmarking is more performance-based, and auditing is closer to
specification, which suggests that benchmarking better predicts energy
243. OGUS, supra note 145, at 591–92.
244. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3130/15(e)(4) (LexisNexis 2018).
245. Id.
246. For instance, benchmarking in New York City is estimated to cost $500-$1500 per
building, while auditing will be around $1.50 per square meter, which could yield a higher total
cost per building. Hsu, supra note 234, at 266.
247. See AARON INGLE ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., BEHAVIORAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOME ENERGY AUDITS: THE ROLE OF AUDITORS, LABELS, REPORTS, AND
AUDIT TOOLS ON HOMEOWNER DECISION-MAKING 12–16 (2012) (finding differences in the
behavioral impact of various energy use auditing tools).
248. See Soren T. Anderson & Richard G. Newell, Information Programs for Technology
Adoption: The Case of Energy-Efficiency Audits, 26 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 27, 27–50
(2004) (observing that approximately 53% of the projects recommended through the Department
of Energy’s Industrial Assessment Center program were adopted).
249. Hsu, supra note 234, at 265.
250. Id. at 266.
251. See OGUS, supra note 148, at 166–68 (noting that performance-based standards are more
effective than specification standards because firms generally have better information for efficient
implementation).
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use and shapes performance standards. In practice, building-level
variation is the most important factor in explaining building energy use,
based on an analysis of a comprehensive dataset of New York City
multifamily buildings.252 In other words, benchmarking is less costly
and can avail a similar quality of information as that of engineer
auditing. This indicates that information disclosure laws can gain more
by requiring benchmarking data than engineering audits to predict
energy performance of buildings. However, by no means should the
benefits of engineer auditing be denied. For instance, energy auditing
can provide end-users with specific measures on energy conservation,
so that the end-users will take action on energy efficiency..253
Information can work as non-price intervention when given in
comparison and at proper frequency. For example, Opower, a data
management company for utilities that has since been acquired by
Oracle, enabled utilities to send energy use reports to customers.254 In
partnership with some utility and electricity suppliers, Opower
provided peer comparison reports for more than 10 million households
in 22 states.255 Those reports show customers how much energy has
been used historically and to what extent they perform better or worse
than their neighbors in energy conservation.
D. GB Standard Setting as a Mix of Regulation and Self-Regulation
Before U.S. law had green building standards, the GB movement
owed its survival to industry-based standards, prominently the LEED
system made by the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC). In theory,
informal rules (like professional conventions and self-imposed
standards) as part of the institutional matrix can play a role to make a
novel change happen. One of the most important industry-based
standards is the LEED system, which increases the stock of knowledge
about building green. Building professionals applying their experience
and knowledge from GB projects created the earliest version of the

252. Hsu, supra note 234, at 269–70.
253. Id. at 271.
254. See Oracle Buys Opower, Oracle, https://www.oracle.com/corporate/acquisitions/
opower/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (“Opower’s solutions enable over 100 global
utilities, such as PG&E, Exelon and National Grid to deliver a modern digital customer
experience. Opower’s big data platform stores and analyzes over 600 billion meter reads from 60
million utility end customers, enabling utilities to proactively meet regulatory requirements,
decrease the cost to serve, and improve customer satisfaction.”).
255. Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman & Alice Shih, Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments
That Peer Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
992, 1016 (2012).
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LEED system. After a series of updates, the LEED system became
simpler and better categorized.
Though the LEED system is industry-made, it also works well for
government agencies and makes them aware of GBs.256 The LEED
system to some degree also lays the foundation for regulations on GB
compliance, in which case LEED also helps the government to define
what qualifies as a GB.257 Additionally, LEED could speed up the GB
movement by the competition it causes in the real estate market.258
Buildings with LEED Silver, Gold or Platinum certificates may be
environmentally superior to those without certificates. In that case,
LEED certification somewhat creates a marketing distinction for the
certified projects. It is likely that more property owners will consider
the LEED standards as they do not want to lose the competitive edge.
Over time, GB compliance took off by virtue of the efforts from
both public and private organizations. Individual activities might not
be influential enough to boost the GB industry as a whole, where the
U.S. government, professional associations, and public interest groups
(PIGs) all advanced GB compliance.
These public and private players sometimes work together for GB
compliance. On the one side, public entities made their own buildings
green, which provided GB compliance with laboratories. In the
meantime, Congress and executive agencies laid out policies and laws
in support of GB compliance.259 In response to the federal legislation,
256. During the early years of GB certification, federal, state, and local government buildings
in the United States made up half the LEED registry. See BLDG. DESIGN & CONSTR., WHITE
PAPER ON SUSTAINABILITY: A REPORT ON THE GREEN BUILDING MOVEMENT 8 (2003).
257. See id. at 23–25 (listing states and municipalities that adopted GB regulations modeled
on LEED standards).
258. See id. at 8 (describing how the competitive design of the LEED scoring system promotes
improving levels of implementation).
259. For instance, in 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which established
a new version of the Model Energy Code (MEC). Funded by the USDOE, the MEC was
originally developed by a group of building organizations, which sets energy efficiency standards
for both new and existing commercial and residential buildings. The MEC has been adopted by
some states in light of the local settings. See 106 Stat. 2776, Pub. L. No. 102-486 (1992), 102d
Congress (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13201); For a list of states that have adopted the MEC, see Status
of
State
Energy
Code
Adoption,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY,
https://www.energycodes.gov/adoption/states (last visited Feb. 2017). On the administrative side,
E.O. 13514 was signed by President Barack Obama in 2009, aiming to design, construct, maintain,
and operate high performance sustainable buildings in sustainable locations. E.O. 13514 laid out
a number of reduction targets on energy intensity, water intensity and construction/demolition
waste of the federal agencies. See Exec. Order No. 13514 (2009), revoked by Exec. Order No.
13693 on Mar. 19, 2015, Sec. 16(b). For more about the federal and local GB laws and regulations,
see Stephen Del Percio & Preston D. Koerner, State and Local Green Building Laws and
Initiatives, in THE LAW OF GREEN BUILDINGS: REGULATORY AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DESIGN,

17. Shen & Faure_ME Final Proof (Do Not Delete)

1/1/2019 6:16 PM

94

[Vol. XXIX:49

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

state and local agencies also put in place a wide range of instruments.260
Those GB laws were one of the main triggers of GB activities, as shown
in a GB market report.261 On the other side, the USGBC has been in
charge of LEED as one of the most important rating systems, updating
LEED standards in light of state-of-the-art technologies; in the
meantime, the USGBC also provides education programs to train
building professionals on GB techniques.
Yet, at some point, players may oppose one another, especially
when PIGs get involved. For instance, the USGBC in its infancy did
not allow trade associations to join, fearing that trade associations with
strong lobbies would take over the USGBC and water down the GB
standards.262 This position changed over time; the USGBC began
meeting with environmental groups alongside trade associations as
early as 2003.263 As is the case with the USGBC, the U.S. government
had to deal with different PIGs in the way of GB movement.264
A mix of regulation and self-regulation has been around in U.S.
GB standard-setting,265 in which case the regulators use industry-based
standards while retaining the authority to change and enforce. This
arrangement does not violate the non-delegation principle unless it
gives the industry the authority to permit and inspect.266 But, at some
CONSTRUCTION, OPERATIONS, AND FINANCING 71–99 (J. Cullen Howe & Michael B. Gerrard
eds., 2011).
260. Del Percio & Koerner, supra note 259.
261. DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 36.
262. BLDG. DESIGN & CONSTR., supra note 256, at 8. Trade associations were allowed
membership in the USGBC in 2005. Bill Walsh, Rick Fedrizzi, USGBC President, CEO &
Founding Chairman Discusses Trade Associations and the USGBC, HEALTHY BLDG. NETWORK
(Sept. 21, 2005), https://healthybuilding.net/blog/134-rick-fedrizzi-usgbc-president-ceo-foundingchairman-discusses-trade-associations-and-the-usgbc.
263. See BLDG. DESIGN & CONSTR., supra note 256, at 8.
264. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Self-regulation, Taxation and Public Voluntary
Environmental Agreements, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1453, 1457–58 (2003) (observing support from
environmental groups and opposition from industry groups for President Clinton’s proposed
energy tax); Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint: Environmentalists
Back Plan They Helped to Draft, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 1993), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/business/1993/03/02/energy-tax-proposal-has-green-tint/a638b16b-45d8-4473-bc914cad55da6538/?utm_term=.b4a5ba1e920e.
265. Compare California Green Building Standards Code, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 24, §§ 401–
901 (2008) (showing that the California Green Building Standards Code does not incorporate any
existing certifications in GB mandates, and only in a few cases refers to the Energy Star or draws
on some specific requirements in the LEED system without specifically referencing the LEED
program), with WASH. REV. CODE § 39.35D.080 (2018) (“The department of community, trade,
and economic development shall not develop its own sustainable building standard, but shall work
with stakeholders to adopt an existing sustainable building standard or criteria appropriate for
affordable housing.”).
266. Edward Teyber, Incorporating Third Party Green Building Rating Systems into
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point, the government may incorporate industry-based rating systems
without expressly referring to a certain version or any specific
requirements. The vagueness as such may not accord with the nondelegation principle,267 since the rules of a rating system could be
changed at the whim of the industry rule-makers without due process
or government approval. Some state and local GB laws have ways of
reflecting the non-delegation principle. Should the government want
to use the LEED system, it can articulate the LEED standards in the
building or zoning codes as appendixes, rather than referring to the
LEED system as a whole; or the government can obtain regulatory
control over changes to industry standards, as is the case with the
Green Buildings Act in Illinois, which requires that the industry rating
system incorporated be analyzed and evaluated by the Capital
Development Board.268
The antitrust issue may be another concern that plagues the
combination of mandates and industry-based standards. Where GB
compliance makes an industry-made GB certification mandatory, the
GB certification, together with the products it referred to, will
dominate the market. In that case, the GB mandates may de facto
reduce competition and create an entry barrier for those who can
supply greener building standards or products.269 For instance, in an old
version of the LEED system, the USGBC required that the wood used
in a LEED project should be verified by the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC), which has given rise to a battle between the FSC and
another wood certification run by the Sustainable Forestry Initiative
(SFI) program.270 The LEED’s exclusive use of the FSC rating system
has been accused of violating antitrust laws when adopted by municipal
governments.271
Municipal Building and Zoning Codes, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 832, 843–44 (2014).
267. Id.
268. Green Buildings Act, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 3130/15(g) (2009) (“The green building
standards contained in this Act shall be analyzed and evaluated by the Board 5 years after the
effective date of this Act or upon the completion of 10 Board green projects, whichever comes
first.”), repealed by 2018 Ill. Laws 100-729, § 15 (2018).
269. OGUS, supra note 145, at 591.
270. See generally Stephen Del Percio, Revisiting Allied Tube and Noerr: The Antitrust
Implications of Green Building Legislation and Case Law Considerations for Policymakers, 34
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 239 (2009).
271. The USGBC itself has tried to fix the problem. As of 2016, the USGBC seems to open
the door to wood certification programs other than the FSC. The USGBC introduced the
Alternative Compliance Path (ACP) pilot to close a loophole in the current raw materials credit
that required only a certain percentage of wood be FSC-certified. The ACP pilot would require
that 100 percent of the wood in a project is verified by a legal source, as defined by ASTM D761210. See Marisa Long, USGBC Announces New LEED Pilot ACP Designed to Help Eliminate
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Yet a remedy for the excluded parties may not always be
workable, as the U.S. Supreme Court has established a state-action
immunity doctrine, which allows state and local governments to be
immune from an antitrust action against their anticompetitive
standards under the FTC or the DOJ.272 This doctrine can apply to
provide immunity to non-state actors as well if a two-pronged
requirement is met.273 Under this doctrine, industry entities that
actually make or enforce GB regulations can reason their anticompetitive activities by proving that what they are doing is authorized
by the state.274
E. The SEP as an Instrument Mix: Liability Meets Regulation
The Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) are
environmentally beneficial projects undertaken by defendants as part
of the settlement of an enforcement action.275 In 2004, the EPA started
to encourage parties to deliver GB projects or other GB strategies on
contaminated properties in exchange for penalty mitigation.276 The
SEP program per se is a dispute settlement policy and not meant to be
used as law by the EPA, defendants, courts, or administrative law
judges in a trial.277 Thus, it largely relies on the EPA’s discretion to
determine whether or not a project will be accepted as a SEP and how
much of the penalty abatement can be given.278
Irresponsibly Sourced Materials—Like Illegal Wood—From the Building Material Supply Chain,
USGBC (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.usgbc.org/articles/usgbc-announces-new-leed-pilot-acpdesigned-help-eliminate-irresponsibly-sourced-materials%E2%80%94.
However, this may not eliminate the antitrust concern, as chances are that the old version of
LEED system is still working when referred by some GB mandates. For instance, LEED v 2009
(or LEED V3) requires parties to ensure that the FSC-certified wood products are installed and
quantify the total percentage of FSC-certified wood products installed. See USGBC, LEED 2009
FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR RENOVATIONS 55 (2009).
272. See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (establishing antitrust immunity
where the state has sanctioned and supervises restraints on competition).
273. The two requirements are: a) there must be a clearly articulated policy to displace
competition, and b) there must be active supervision by the state of the policy or activity. See
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1980)
(clarifying the two-point inquiry).
274. Darren A. Prum, Robert J. Aalberts & Stephen Del Percio, In Third Parties We Trust?
The Growing Antitrust Impact of Third-Party Green Building Certification Systems for State and
Local Governments, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191, 221 (2012).
275. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS POLICY
2015 UPDATE 1 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/
sepupdatedpolicy15.pdf.
276. Edwards, supra note 164, at 878–80.
277. See id.
278. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 275, at 1–2.
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The SEP policy has as its goals environmental justice,279 pollution
reduction, and technological innovation.280 Perhaps for its proenvironment goals, the SEP program has been referred to by the
federal and state laws as a method of environmental enforcement.281 In
the case of GB compliance, the SEPs are taken by the EPA as a means
of environmental restoration, like building energy efficiency
improvement, or of pollution prevention, such as waste disposal.282 It is
more often the case that the regulator makes GBs as the SEPs, in the
interest of brownfield redevelopment. In this way, a violator can agree
to pay or use GB technologies for the redevelopment of brownfields in
the vicinity.283 The regulator can more easily spot noncompliance as the
EPA or its regional counterparts are close to the violators.284
The SEP program appears to be a mix of liability and regulation.
It is derived from liability suits originally,285 where private parties
detect harm. An incentive for a defendant to propose an SEP is the
potential reduction in penalties. When the defendant seeks an SEP, the
settlement of a suit is in the EPA’s hands, so the EPA determines and

279. The idea is that defendants are encouraged to conduct SEPs in communities where there
are environmental justice concerns. SEPs can help the government to identify and address
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental impacts of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority and low income populations in the United States and its
territories. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 275, at 3–4.
280. As declared in the SEP policy, “SEPs provide defendants with an opportunity to develop
and demonstrate new technologies that may prove more protective of human health and the
environment than existing processes and procedures. SEPs also provide the EPA with a unique
opportunity to observe and evaluate new technologies which might, should they prove effective
and efficient, lead to better standard industry practices.” See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 275, at 5.
281. The CAA is the only environmental statute in which Congress has explicitly mentioned
the use of SEPs. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (2000). The USEPA has tried to incorporate SEPs into
settlements for violations of various federal statutes, including the TSCA, the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (EPCRA), RCRA, the Clean Water Act (CWA)
and the Clean Air Act (CAA). Laurie Droughton, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A
Bargain for the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789, 793 (1995). At the state level, at least
30 out of the 50 states have laid out legislation or regulations to run the SEPs. See Steven Bonorris
et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Supplemental
Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS W-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 188 (2005).
282. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS: GREEN
BUILDING ON CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 3 (2004).
283. Id. at 2.
284. Id.
285. Until mid-1980s, the CWA was the only statute that allowed citizens to file suits against
polluters on behalf of the United States and to seek civil penalties. The use of SEPs was partly
facilitated by citizen suits brought under CWA. See Charles S. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the
Forests: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution’s
Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1957 (1995).
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oversees what the defendant should do to compensate the harm
through the proposed SEP. However, the SEP policy in its current form
does not seem to make the SEPs work in any case.286 One of the reasons
behind the policy could be that the SEP might somewhat undermine
the deterrence of liability. It could at times allow a defendant to benefit
from her or his wrongdoing.
The EPA has stressed that the SEPs are not meant to replace
penalties and thus excluded projects that generate profits in the first
five years.287 In the brownfield case, for instance, GBs as SEPs cannot
be built on brownfields owned by the violator.288 Yet some proenvironment projects by their nature would not bring quick profits, but
over time, it could be a lucrative business. As is the case for GB
compliance, the average payback period of a GB renovation is five to
seven years in the United States.289 Apart from profits, the SEPs can
also bring other non-monetary benefits such as a good public image or
a better environmental audit that can improve a company’s compliance
status and reduce the risk of future enforcement actions.290 In either
case, the SEPs may de facto allow polluters to benefit from their
wrongdoing, which is at odds with the SEP policy. When the penalty
turns into profits or other benefits, “the SEP dollars simply do not have
the same deterrent effect as penalty dollars.”291 On that account, the
SEPs done by third parties have been proposed to reinforce the
deterrence of the SEP policy.292 But this way may be at odds with the
environmental justice goal of the SEP policy as it is in some ways
likened to liability.
On the other side, the SEP may be misused by governments to bog
down citizen suits.293 The SEPs were not based on any statutory ground
until the section 505 of the CWA was amended to allow the
government to find and deter problematic settlements wherever
286. A study shows that, in cases involving penalties, fewer than 12% of settlements annually
used SEPs from 1992 to 2006. Kenneth T. Kristl, Making a Good Idea Even Better: Rethinking the
Limits on Supplemental Environmental Projects, 31 VT. L. REV. 217, 219 (2006).
287. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 275, at 32.
288. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 282, at 3.
289. DODGE DATA & ANALYTICS, supra note 3, at 37.
290. Kristl, supra note 286, at 263.
291. Id.
292. Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used in
Citizen Suits to Deter Future Violations as Well as to Achieve Significant Additional Environmental
Benefits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 414, 449 (2004).
293. See generally David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1552–1657 (1995).
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possible. According to the amended section 505, a citizen suit would be
excluded if any state agency starts prosecuting the issue within 45
days.294 This has become the rule rather than the exception in some
jurisdictions, where the government tends to over-file citizen suits at
the requests of polluters. This will make some citizen suits that seek
environmental protection end up releasing the polluters.295 In the case
of GB compliance, citizen suits could be a way to combat land
contamination or building-related illness. The Clean Air Act (CAA) is
meant to regulate outdoor air quality rather than indoor air pollution.
Citizen suits allow plaintiffs to file a suit against personal injuries
caused by building materials. Under the citizen suit provision, the
plaintiffs may not receive damages but are still able to abate the
harm.296 Elsewhere, citizen suits have played a role in C/D waste
disposal and brownfields reclamation. Public interest groups (PIGs) as
well as commercial plaintiffs are entitled to seek cleanup of wastes
alleged to be causing an imminent and substantial endangerment,
according to RCRA’s citizen suit provision.297
Yet the SEPs may not always be in accordance with the existing
U.S. laws. The SEPs are bound by the Miscellaneous Receipts Act
(MRA), which mandates that all penalties should go to the Treasury.298
This has led the EPA to be more cautious in seeking SEPs and to stress
in its latest policy that the SEPs are not penalties.299 Elsewhere, some
SEP proponents suggest setting up an Environmental Trust run by the
EPA, as an attempt to quell any legal doubt. The money is delivered to
294. Clean Water Act §505, codified at 33 U.S.C §1365 (2006).
295. See Hodas, supra note 293, at 1648 (noting that “states sometimes take action against a
polluter at its request in order to shield that polluter from a citizen suit; this type of preemptive
action does not succeed in protecting the environment.”).
296. Guiffrida, supra note 217, at 339 n.192.
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf . . . against any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or
present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or
who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment.”).
298. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2000); Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, Dir., U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency Office of Regulatory Enf’t, to Reg’l Counsel et al., 2 (Oct. 31, 2002) (“An adequate nexus
is important because it ensures that the Agency complies with the SEP Policy and the
requirements of the MRA.”).
299. See Douglas Rubin, How Supplemental Environmental Projects Can and Should Be Used
to Advance Environmental Justice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 179, 195
(2010) (“The EPA apparently justifies its restrictive SEP policies by claiming that they are bound
by the MRA.”).
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the environmental trust, not to the EPA. The environmental trust
would later be used by the EPA or a third-party contractor to
implement an SEP.300
However, the SEP policy, as one of its goals suggests, means more
than just paying for harm. It might also take into account
environmental justice.301 If the money goes into the Environmental
Trust, instead of being dedicated to a particular use, there is no
guarantee that penalty funds will be reinvested in vulnerable
communities that bear the harm.302 Besides, an SEP does not simply
create a money-for-right-to-pollute situation, it might also relate to
restorative justice.
An SEP largely relies on the defendant to carry out the project
once accepted, in which situation the defendant should not only write
a check but also correct her wrongdoing.303 This appears to be slightly
different from the Superfund under CERCLA, wherein the EPA
generally is in charge of remedial work with the money collected from
injurers. As the description makes clear, the SEP has mainly been used
so far for environmental concerns other than the implementation of a
GB policy. However, SEPs can and have also been used to promote
GB compliance, although their primary goal is, of course, broader than
that.
F. Conclusions
This description of the use of instruments to promote GB in the
United States shows that a joint use of instruments is both theoretically
sound and successfully implemented in practice.
300. See Brooke E. Robertson, Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1025, 1038 (2009) (“The EPA’s current SEP policy could be improved by
taking three steps: creating and managing an Environmental Trust that would be used to complete
SEPs, increasing the mitigation percentage to 100% and relaxing the nexus requirement, and
allowing third-party contractors to bid on and carry out SEP contracts.”).
301. The SEP policy aims to “ensure that residents who spend significant portions of their
time in, or depend on food and water sources located near the areas affected by violations will be
protected.” See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 275, at 4. Corresponding to the SEP goal,
the California EPA was required by legislature to establish a SEP policy to create a public process
to solicit potential SEPs from “disadvantaged communities.” The California EPA may assign
“disadvantaged community” status based on socioeconomic factors, but the underlying statute
does not mention indicators like race, ethnicity, or national origin. The Act also emphasizes SEP’s
value to disadvantaged communities, but it does not limit SEPs to those communities. See A.B.
1071, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), § 2(b)(3), (c); § 2(b)(4).
302. Eric A. DeBellis, Implementing Supplemental Environmental Project Policies to Promote
Restorative Justice, ECOLOGY L. Q. (2016), http://elq.typepad.com/currents/2016/03/
implementing-supplemental-environmental-project-policies-to-promote-restorative-justice.html.
303. Id.
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Self-regulation was critical to the start of GB compliance. Given
the benefits of GB compliance, the U.S. government used three types
of instruments that encouraged GBs to grow faster over the past
decade. On the one hand, the U.S. government tends to finance GBs
through tax reductions, public procurements, and loans, rather than
providing subsidies. On the other hand, mandates are increasingly used
in GB promotion. It is usually the case that the government
incorporates industry-based standards into mandates, meanwhile
retaining the power to permit and change the standards, lest it delegate
too much lawmaking authority to the industry. The suasive approach,
which mainly takes the form of information disclosure, can perform
better than behavioral interventions for building energy efficiency. The
logic behind this is that sometimes the way energy is used matters more
than the technologies per se. Giving real-time or peer-comparison
information to end-users can nudge them to perform better in energy
use, as is the case in the Opower program.
V. PRACTICE
After this sketch of the instruments to promote GB compliance, it
is equally interesting to briefly address the empirical evidence—albeit
scarce—that is available concerning the relative effectiveness of the
various instruments. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence does not
address all of the instruments discussed above.
Of the market-based instruments, public procurement in
particular has been subject to empirical research. Some evidence shows
a positive relationship between the adoption of government GB
procurement policies and the number of LEED-certified private
buildings.304 An empirical study shows that the LEED standard
prevails twice as fast among private developers in cities that have GB
public procurement policies compared to cities without similar policies
but of similar size, demographics, and environmental preferences.305
The study further suggests that public procurements encourage
building professionals to invest in GB skills. However, public
procurements may not make a significant difference in making
consumers, developers, and suppliers more aware of LEED

304. See Timothy Simcoe & Michael W. Toffel, Public Procurement and the Private Supply of
Green Buildings 29 (Harvard Envtl. Econ. Program, Discussion Paper 12-42, 2012) (finding that
the positive spillovers from public procurement are based on private developers adopting the
LEED certification in line with municipal bylaws that encourage GB practices).
305. Id. at 2.
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certification.306 There are other reasons for which public procurement
can pay off, as the study points out, including “demonstration effects,
moral suasion, scale economies, learning effects, anticipated regulatory
changes, and a correlation between municipal GB policies and
preferential treatment in the municipal permitting process for
developers offering GBs.”307
Empirical evidence is also available concerning the effects of
PACE loans. It was expected, as mentioned above, that PACE would
allow the property owner to repay a debt in the form of future property
taxes and that it could lead to better financing terms. However, the
empirical evidence shows that these two anticipated benefits of PACE
financing fail to make PACE loans attractive. On the one hand, it
might be illusory to say that homeowners would be free from long-term
PACE financing obligations, as homeowners are not the only parties
that leverage the bargaining.308 Rational buyers take into account any
lien on a property, including a PACE lien. Throughout the bargaining
process, sellers are likely to be asked by buyers, or by lenders who have
secured interests in the properties, to fulfill the financing obligations
on a PACE loan;309 alternatively, buyers may take over the PACE
financing obligations in return for a lower selling price of the property.
In neither case will PACE financing lead to lower transaction costs to
property owners than a normal private mortgage loan. On the other
hand, the priority given to a PACE lien appears to clash with the
underwriting restrictions in financial regulations.310
There is a great deal of empirical literature on the effects of
liability litigation in the United States. Just to mention a few studies
related to the issue of forum-shopping discussed above: some empirical
evidence has shown that the plaintiffs’ lawyers in asbestos litigations
tend to file a suit in jurisdictions with the most favorable legal rules,
judges, or juries.311 Yet forum-shopping may create too many trials for
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 11.
Cox, supra note 203, at 96.
See JASON COUGHLIN, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
PHOTOVOLTAICS AS AN ELIGIBLE MEASURE IN RESIDENTIAL PACE PROGRAMS: BENEFITS
AND CHALLENGES 3 (2010) (noting that these programs are still new and need further research
but “it is possible that both mortgage lenders and prospective home buyers will be influenced by
the existence of a special lien on the house”).
310. See FHFA Statement, supra note 207.
311. See Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Innovations and Forum Shopping,
35 J. LEG. STUD. 365, 366 (2006) (examining how forum shopping and procedural innovations
affect the outcomes of asbestos trials using a new data set of all asbestos trials from 1987 to 2003
in the US).
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the court to handle expeditiously. On that account, the U.S. courts have
made use of bifurcated trials, bouquet trials, or consolidated trials to
shorten long dockets.312 These trials, together with forum-shopping,
help to directly raise damage awards and higher settlement levels
indirectly.313 But those studies are obviously of interest for liability
rules and less related to the effectiveness of GB.
There is interesting research concerning the effects of the creation
of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) by the EPA: some studies find
that the release of information by the EPA can result in positive
outcomes, such as better environmental behavior by firms,314 or
increased spending on environmental and natural resource
programs.315 On the flip side, it may also lead to inefficient allocation
of costs and benefits for clean firms and polluters.316
Also, other suasive instruments have been subject to empirical
study, more particularly the difference between auditing and
benchmarking with respect to energy efficiency projects, discussed
above. In practice, it is empirically shown that building-level variation

312. A consolidated trial is where suits filed by different plaintiffs are heard by the same jury.
The jury then makes separate decisions for each plaintiff. Bifurcation is a way to divide trials into
two phases. After the first phase, the judge will suspend the case and allow parties to negotiate.
If the parties cannot reach a settlement, the judge will resume the trial. In most of the cases,
liability will be determined in the first phase, followed by damages decided in the second phase;
however, this would go the other way around when it comes to asbestos trials. Bouquet trials are
like consolidated trials but with a smaller group of plaintiffs chosen from a large group of claims.
The decision on the bouquet trial would later be used as a model to settle all of the cases in the
large group. Id. at 372–76.
313. Id. at 396 (explaining that while bifurcated and bouquet trials can increase plaintiffs’
expected returns, consolidated suits feature mixed impacts with small consolidations of less than
five claims raising the probabilities of plaintiffs winning and receiving punitive damages and larger
consolidations lowering expected returns).
314. See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of
Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 123
(1997) (“New information concerning a firm’s toxic emissions that has a significant effect on
market valuation is likely to induce that firm to significantly reduce subsequent emissions and to
otherwise improve its environmental performance.”).
315. See Dennis M. Patten, The Impact of the EPA’s TRI Disclosure Program on State
Environmental and Natural Resource Expenditures, 17 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368 (1998)
(“[H]igher levels of reported toxic releases per capita per square mile for 1988 are correlated with
increases in state allocations to environmental and natural resource programs over the
subsequent two fiscal years.”).
316. See Magali Delmas, Maria J. Montes-Sancho & Jay P. Shimshack, Information
Disclosure Policies: Evidence from the Electricity Industry, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 483, 485 (2010)
(“Our results suggest that firms that already use substantial amounts of clean fuels most
significantly increase clean fuel percentages in response to disclosure programs. Similarly, firms
that already use relatively small amounts of fossil fuels most significantly decrease fossil fuel usage
in response to disclosure programs.”).
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is the most important factor in explaining building energy use, based
on an analysis of a comprehensive dataset of New York City
multifamily buildings.317 This indicates that information disclosure laws
can be more cost-effective by requiring less costly benchmarking data
than the use of engineering audits to predict energy performance of
buildings.318
The most interesting empirical studies involve the information
program by the Opower company. Empirical studies have tested
whether the Opower program can work in different areas. A field
experiment of 80,000 households in Minnesota has shown that monthly
peer feedback could reduce energy consumption by 1.9 to 2.0 percent
relative to the baseline.319 Likewise, evidence from another two field
experiments have shown that, among 170,000 household customers of
two utilities, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) and
Puget Sound Energy (PSE), households getting peer comparison
reports tend to reduce energy use by 1.2% (PSE) to 2.1% (SMUD).320
In addition, households with more pre-treatment energy use score
better than those with less baseline energy consumption.321
The two studies have shown that information can modify customer
behaviors, yet a “boomerang effect” is likely to happen when customer
behaviors are put in comparison.322 In that case, customers with lower
reported energy use may be less motivated to reduce or may even
increase their energy use. Even if the information is able to improve
customer behavior, one might further question how long the effects of
behavioral interventions could possibly last. Through data from
234,000 households receiving personalized energy use reports under
the Opower program, a study found that consumers are likely to reduce
energy use shortly after being informed about their energy
performance; however, the effects would die out if no further
information follows.323 Such an “action-and-backsliding” situation
317. Hsu, supra note 234, at 263.
318. However, by no means should the benefits of engineer auditing be denied. For instance,
energy auditing can provide end-users with specific measures on energy conservation, so that the
end-users will take action on energy efficiency. Id. at 270.
319. HUNT ALLCOTT, SOCIAL NORMS AND ENERGY CONSERVATION, CTR. ENERGY &
ENVTL. POLICY RESEARCH 3 (Oct. 2009).
320. Ayres, Raseman & Shih, supra note 255, at 992.
321. Id. at 1015; see also Allcott, supra note 319, at 1093 (“I also show that treatment effects
increase markedly as a function of pre-treatment usage.”).
322. ALLCOTT, supra note 319, at 1093.
323. Hunt Allcott & Todd Rogers, The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Behavioral
Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 3003, 3004
(2014).
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would be less likely to happen as consumers get used to the reports
coming monthly over a long term, in which case the consumers may
change their capital stock of habits or physical technologies.324 But it
might take more than two years for those behavioral changes to happen
and last.325 The Opower program suggests that, when it comes to
changing behaviors, an informational program could better pay off
when the treatment is frequently available.
In practice, the SEP policy may not always turn out the way the
federal policy has pictured. The SEPs have been more commonly used
in citizen suits and by state environmental regulators, mostly in light of
the Clean Water Act.326 By contrast, the SEPs did not appear to play a
big part in the EPA’s enforcement,327 but it has been suggested that
they should play a larger role at the federal level.328 At the state level,
the SEPs are said to work for larger companies rather than small
violators.329 Small violators will be otherwise required to pay cash or
small contributions to a large SEP, rather than to implement an SEP
on their own. The implementation of the SEP will then change hands
to a third party. This method has been utilized in Vermont, California,
New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania.330 Elsewhere, the SEPs are not
meant to be done handled a third party, as the regulator may not be
able to oversee and hold a third party liable in case of
noncompliance.331 Equally important, state regulators are not strangers
to trans-boundary issues when it comes to environmental compliance.
Perhaps on that account, some states make it possible for an SEP to go
beyond borders, as has been the case in Texas.332
324. Id. at 3034.
325. Id. at 3005.
326. Daniel Press, Peter Holloran & Brian Petersen, Enforcement-Driven Financing of Water
Quality in California: The Case of Supplemental Environmental Projects 5 (Univ. Cal. Water Res.
Ctr, Tech. Completion Report Project No. WR1022, 2010), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/
0cv8d56h.
327. During fiscal years 2001-2009, the EPA settled 4,133 formal enforcement actions that
resulted in an administrative penalty, but only 163 ended up with a SEP. The record on the use of
SEPs may vary with the Administration. Id. at 8; see also William Galose & Musa Essayyad, What
Determines Whether the Settlement of a US EPA Case Includes A Supplemental Environmental
Project: Lessons Learned from US History, 1 GLOBAL REV. BUS. & ECON. RES. (2014).
328. See Robertson, supra note 300, at 1046–51.
329. Bonorris et al., supra note 281, at 216.
330. Id. at 217. However, states do differ in their requirements for the contributions. For
instance, Pennsylvania “requires that the donation must be dedicated to a specified project, and
not merely to the general accounts of a non-profit organization,” but in California, a contribution
to a non-profit organization may count.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 218 (The Texas SEP rules allow violators, on some conditions, to undertake SEPs
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In the use of SEPs, regulators and the regulated tend to focus more
on the deterrent effects333 and the reduction of transaction costs,
whereas the environmental justice goal is less frequently discussed.334
On the regulators’ side, an SEP may not be cheap and easy to oversee,
despite its environmental benefits.335 In the case of liability, a violator
only needs to pay the damages, yet the remedy may not end that easily
if an SEP comes into play as part of a settlement. In that case, a longterm commitment is needed from the regulated and the regulators at
stake. Differently put, an SEP solution may avail less certainty and lead
to a higher cost, particularly in the case of a loose-end project.
A better way to oversee the SEPs with a lower cost is to encourage
projects with a definite timeline, as has been the case in Maine and
Pennsylvania.336 Apart from the time limit, the regulator in Maine
requires the violator to prove that he or she is financially capable of
doing the project.337 In the meantime, Maine outsourced its oversight
power in part to the University of Maine and made the violator pay the
oversight costs.338 In this way, the regulator may bear less oversight
costs, and the third-party supervisor may be neutral to push forward
the project. Violators view the SEP policy as actually lowering the costs
of noncompliance, given the uncertainty around the amount reported
and calculated by the regulated.339

in Mexico, which sits next to and shares natural resources with Texas); see also TEX. COMM’N ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, GI-352, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS. PUTTING FINES TO
WORK CLOSER TO HOME 4 (Oct. 2015), https://www.tccq.texas.gov/assets/public/comm_
exec/pubs/gi-/gi-352.pdf.
333. See Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich Earnhart, The Comparative Effectiveness of
Government Interventions on Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 317, 364–68 (2007) (discussing the industry perceptions of SEPs as deterrents).
334. Bonorris et al., supra note 281, at 218–19.
335. For instance, in Colorado, a big Denver company was found to be non-compliant with
air pollution prevention regulations and was fined a noncompliance penalty of $30,065 and a civil
penalty of $395,000 (which was later reduced to $316,000 because of the company’s cooperation
with the state). At the approval of the Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment,
Air Pollution Division, the company undertook an SEP that made use of the utility’s wind power
and would result in an 80% reduction of the penalty. The SEP also led to a reduction in nitrous
oxide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon dioxide, as well as the need for landfill disposal. NAT.
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROJECTS USING RENEWABLE ENERGY: A NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESSING AIR QUALITY
VIOLATION PENALTIES 1 (2001), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy01osti/29661.pdf.
336. Bonorris et al., supra note 281, at 219–20.
337. Id. at 219.
338. Id.
339. David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement Reform: The Case
of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1184.
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It is also likely that violators will overestimate the costs of an SEP
in an attempt to reduce penalties.340 As a result, the SEP policy may
lead to under-deterrence. Some empirical evidence has reflected this
observation. In the case of compliance with the Clean Water Act
(“CWA-related performance”) at facilities, Glicksman and Earnhart
have shown that an SEP can better deter violators that are already
subject to the SEP (“specific deterrence”) than it does to the potential
violators in the general regulated community (“general deterrence”).341
This brief overview of some of the available empirical evidence
provides interesting information on the relative effectiveness of the
various instruments used in the United States to promote green
building. There is no empirical study to the best of our knowledge, on
the effectiveness of command-and-control regulation; however, that is
not to say that those regulations are ineffective for GB. The studies
with respect to the market-based instruments show that at least the
public procurement policy seems to have the desired effects. This is not
the case for the PACE program. However, this result may have more
to do with particular design defects in the PACE program rather than
proving that financial instruments do not work.
However, the most striking results possibly come from the suasive
instruments. All three studies, and especially the Opower program,
show positive effects of the various information programs. In this
domain, encouraging stakeholders toward energy efficiency seems to
work. Again, one should be careful with drawing too strong of a
conclusion on the basis of the few empirical studies available, especially
since not all instruments have been tested and comparisons between
the different instruments are also difficult. But at least the positive
effects of the suasive (information disclosure) instruments are striking.
Perhaps it is related to the fact that GB is a domain of environmental
law and policy where the goal is indeed not so much to cure negative
340. Bonorris et al., supra note 281, at 206.
341. See Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 333, at 367–68. Using data from the 499 major
chemical manufacturing facilities across the United States during the years 1995 and 2001,
Glicksman and Earnhart compared the effectiveness of different governmental interventions on
environmental performance in the chemical industry. Id. at 326. The study made a distinction
between general deterrence and specific deterrence. Id. at 321–22. Specific deterrence is meant
to identify and return specific violators to compliance, on the assumption that the regulated will
comply when it costs less to comply than to violate. Id. at 335–36. General deterrence can work
to induce compliance in the broader regulated community, based on the increased subsequent
penalty likelihood and increased subsequent penalty size. Id. at 335. Given the distinction, the
study tests the effectiveness of fines, injunctions and the SEPs in the CWA-related performance.
Part of their findings have shown that fines and SEPs are equally effective in reaping specific
deterrence; yet fines turn out to be more effective than the SEPs as general deterrents. Id. at 367.
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externalities but to promote positive externalities related to energy
efficiency. To create those positive externalities, the most important
function of legal intervention is to influence subjective perceptions of
stakeholders by creating behavioral changes.
VI. CONCLUSION
GB compliance deals with various environmental elements and
thus needs to engage different building stakeholders, including
individuals, governments, and professional associations. Yet not all of
those stakeholders have the incentives to build green, and they may fail
to work cooperatively. The law can play an important role in shaping
the incentive structure and integrating the dispersion of stakeholders
and knowledge, as it might do for GB compliance.
The theoretical analysis showed that a variety of instruments could
be put in place to promote GB—more particularly command-andcontrol, market-based, and suasive instruments. However, this article
equally argued that no single instrument in isolation can adequately
promote GB because no instrument in isolation can overcome all
challenges that confront GB compliance. Therefore, this article argued
that law should search for a smart mix of instruments to promote GB.
One may notice that in the United States the joint use of
instruments has indeed, as predicted, been used to promote GB. A few
conclusions can be drawn from the evolution of the use of instruments
in GB promotion in the United States. First, in early times selfregulation can play an important role, at which point the governments
should not immediately make regulations; instead, governments could
lend support by greening their own buildings to showcase the benefits
of GB compliance. Second, GB compliance might be voluntary at first,
but it is likely to become mandatory over time, in which case laws and
regulations may play a bigger role to further GB compliance. Third, a
joint effort of government regulation and self-regulation could have a
major place in GB laws by transforming industry-based certifications
into mandates. Apart from sanctions and financial incentives, eventual
government regulation can also be expected to enlist private
information or non-price interventions to foster GB compliance,
preferably through reporting and liability.

